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Justice Lewis Powell often cast the critical fifth vote on a severely divided
Supreme Court. In this article, Professor Kahn argues thatJustice Powell's
jurisprudence is characterized by a balancing approach that seeks to accom-
modate competing claims. He asserts that this "representative balancing"
methodology derives from Justice Powell's belief that the role of a Justice is to
reflect in adjudication the existing distribution of values and authority among
the competing factions that constitute the contemporary community. Professor
Kahn concludes that representative balancing is an unacceptable foundation
for judicial review, because it fails to provide principled explanations for re-
sults and, therefore, is open to the charge that it usurps the functions of the
political institutions of government.
On June 26, at the end of the 1986 Term, Justice Lewis Powell an-
nounced his retirement from the Supreme Court. Political and legal com-
t Associate Professor, Yale Law School. Research on this paper was done in connection with the
Center for Philosophy and Public Policy Project on Judicial Ethics and Responsibility. A shorter
version will appear in JUDGING JuDxGs (D. Luban ed.) (forthcoming). I would like to thank Bruce
Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Lea Brilmayer, Robert Burt, Owen Fiss, Paul Gewirtz, Catherine lino,
Anthony Kronman and David Luban for their many helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank
Paul Wolfson and Edward Lazarus for their research assistance.
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mentators were quick to note the dramatic significance this particular res-
ignation may have for the work of the Court." Justice Powell had long
been the critical fifth vote on a severely divided Court.' Powell was not
just the deciding fifth vote; rather, he brought with his vote a particular
jurisprudence. The question now is not simply which particular decisions
may be reversed as a result of Justice Powell's departure, but whether his
jurisprudential approach will survive.3 More important still, should it
survive?
Powell was not just at the center statistically.' His jurisprudence ac-
cepted that central role as its defining feature. For Powell, the goal of
constitutional adjudication was to find the center, to strike the balance
between competing interests. The model of the judicial "balance" ap-
peared over and over again in Powell's opinions. He pursued a balancing
approach to issues of federalism,' free speech,6 free press,7 equal protec-
tion,8 separation of powers,' criminal procedure, 0 and criminal punish-
ment.1" In fact, apart from issues of the Court's own jurisdiction, no area
of constitutional law was immune from Powell's balancing approach.1
1. See TIME, July 6, 1987, at 10; Wash. Post, June 27, 1987, at Al, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 27,
1987, at Al, col. 6.
2. Over the last five years, Powell voted with the majority in almost three-fourths of the Court's
5-4 decisions (118 of 161). He was in the majority in those 5-4 decisions more than any other
Justice, both over the whole period and in each year separately. Notably, in the 1986 Term, Powell
joined the conservative Justices (Rehnquist, White, O'Connor and Scalia) on 18 occasions, yet also
voted with the liberal four (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) seven times. No other coali-
tion emerged in more than four cases. Similarly, in the 1985 Term, Powell joined the conservatives
(then including Burger rather than Scalia) 13 times and the liberals six times, while no other coalition
emerged more than three times. These data are drawn from statistics compiled between 1982 and
1987 by the Harvard Law Review.
3. Remarkably, there is little scholarly work on the jurisprudence of contemporary Justices. The
literature on Justice Powell is, however, more substantial than that on most Justices. See The Sympo-
sium in Honor of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 68 VA. L. RE v. 161-458 (1982) (includes articles by
Be Vier, Estreicher, Freund, Martin, Merrill, Oaks, Stephan, & Whitman); Gunther, In Search of
Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case ofJustice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001 (1972);
Howard, Mr. Justice Powell and the Emerging Nixon Majority, 70 MIcH. L. R.v. 445 (1972);
Maltz, Portrait of a Man in the Middle-Mr. Justice Powell, Equal Protection, and the Pure Clas-
sification Problem, 40 OHio Sr. L.J. 941 (1979); Vrofsky, Mr. Justice Powell and Education: The
Balancing of Competing Values, 13 J.L. & Enwu- 581 (1984); Yackle, Thoughts on Rodriguez: Mr.
Justice Powell and the Demise of Equal Protection Analysis in the Supreme Court, 9 U. RICH. L.
REv. 181 (1975).
4. Of Powell's seven concurrences in the 1986 Term, for example, three provided the majority in
5-4 decisions.
5. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
6. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 73 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
7. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
8. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
9. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
10. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
11. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
12. This does not mean that Powell invoked a balance in every opinion. Interestingly, in some
instances he adopted a categorical or non-balancing approach and subsequently attempted to construe
the opinion as employing a balance. Compare Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)
(non-balancing) with American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring) (balancing);
compare Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (non-balancing) with Reeves, Inc.
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The concept of "balancing" is itself both a metaphor and an abstrac-
tion. The metaphor is ambiguous. It describes both a process of measuring
competing interests to determine which is "weightier" and a particular
substantive outcome characterized as a "balance" of competing interests.13
The abstract concept of balancing, furthermore, tells us nothing about
which interests, rights, or principles get weighed or how weights are
assigned.
While balancing has emerged as the jurisprudential model at the center
of the modern Court's work,14 few commentators have analyzed what goes
on within the "black box" of the judicial balance. 5 To invoke a balance is
to recognize that legitimate, judicially cognizable interests are in tension
and that not all can be completely satisfied. That is true, however, in all
difficult moral and political situations. Balancing as a method of decision-
making is not unique to the judicial role. Not whether, but how, one bal-
ances is the interesting question. This Article attempts to focus scholarly
attention on this question by exploring Justice Powell's employment of a
variety of forms of balancing and then subjecting to critical analysis that
form which best characterizes his jurisprudence.
Within the broad category of "balancing" are three distinguishable
models, which I term "representative," "administrative," and "zero-sum"
balancing. The representative and zero-sum balances refer to two different
perspectives on the problem of resolving conflicts among competing claims.
Representative balancing seeks to accommodate each claim; it does not
completely reject any claim. Zero-sum balancing, in contrast, makes an
exclusive choice rather than an accommodation. Instead of a "balanced"
outcome, zero-sum balancing determines which claim is weightier and ele-
vates that claim over others.
The distinctive quality of the administrative balance is its quantitative
character. It presents a quantitative assessment and comparison of com-
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 447 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (balancing).
13. See Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balandng, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 946 (1987).
14. Although at best a very rough measure of the prevalence of the balancing model, the word
"balance" or "balancing" does appear in 214 of the 473 cases decided in the last three years.
15. See Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022,
1046 (1978) ("It is time to begin to disentangle the web of balancing, penetrate its rhetoric, and
analyze and sort out its doctrinal elements."). The best of the contemporary works on balancing are
C. Duc:'r, MoDws OF CONs'riritrrIONA. INT 'RPRrATION 116-92 (1978), and Aleinikoff, supra
note 13. An older literature on balancing reflects primarily the debate between Justice Black and
Justices Harlan and Frankfurter on whether the First Amendment should be interpreted within an
absolutist or a balancing framework. See Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J.
1424 (1962); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50
CALIF. L. RE:v. 821 (1962); Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendel-
son, 51 CAIF. L. REv. 729 (1963); Mendelson, The First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A
Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. RFv. 479 (1964); Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on
the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. Rtv. 428 (1967). An even older literature on balancing is found
in the writings associated with legal realism. See B. CARDoZo, THE NATURF OF THE JUDICIAL
PitoC:vs (1921); Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1943); Pound, The
Theoty of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REv. 641 (1923).
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peting claims. A quantitative approach to balancirig can be used to achieve
either a representative or a zero-sum balance. It is representative if used
to determine the point at which each interest achieves its maximum satis-
faction consistent with the recognition and equal respect of competitive
claims. This is, for example, roughly the model behind the economists'
concept of pareto optimality. Alternatively, the administrative balance is
zero-sum if used to determine which of a number of competing interests
has the greatest weight under the particular circumstances and is thus
entitled to recognition to the exclusion of the others. The administrative
balance usually appears in judicial decisions in the zero-sum form. But
even then, the model promises that each competing interest will be given
appropriate weight in the process of adjudication itself, if not in the result.
Although this three-fold typology is useful for understanding the struc-
ture of judicial balancing in general, and specifically the structure of Pow-
ell's decisionmaking, I will argue that for Powell the representative bal-
ance was fundamental. Administrative balancing was attractive to him
because it promises objectivity in the process of accommodation. Zero-sum
balancing, while often employed by Powell, was, because of its exclusive
rather than inclusive nature, inconsistent with his deepest beliefs about the
judicial role. This inconsistency led Powell to refocus adjudication on
management of conflict, rather than resolution of the individual case. The
case itself became only a moment in a larger process of balancing compet-
ing interests.
Once Powell's approach to judicial decisionmaking is clear, I shall ar-
gue that his balancing methodology was directly tied to his understanding
of the substantive role of a Justice. That role was to impart to adjudica-
tion the existing distribution of values and authority among the competing
factions that constitute the community. The key to understanding Powell's
claim to represent the contemporary community is understanding the
methodology of balancing as a means of locating the Justice within the
community. The appeal of balancing to Justice Powell rested upon the
methodological assumption that all substantive values must derive from
the free competition of interests within the community. The appeal of rep-
resentative balancing, in particular, is its requirement that the Justice reg-
ulate that competition among interests by reference to the value of plural-
ism, of openness to all factions.
Finally, I will argue that this is an unacceptable foundation for the
constitutional function of judicial review. Balancing, for Powell, was an
attempt to stay within the community, to claim legitimacy as a member of
the community. That community is a product of historical factors that
cannot be comprehended in principled argument. For just that reason, a
Powell opinion inevitably falls silent at the critical moment of decision. It




Balancing cannot provide an adequate foundation for judicial review
because the Court must explain and justify its results. Articulate argu-
ment, not silent intuition, is the only possible source of legitimacy for judi-
cial review. Without such an explanation at the heart of the judicial deci-
sion, the Court is open to charges that it has usurped the functions of the
political institutions of government. Powell himself seemed to recognize
this when he narrowly interpreted Article III standing requirements to
impose a strict injury test on litigants. Powell's standing jurisprudence
excluded many interests in the community and was thus inconsistent with
the representative balancing that characterized much of his work.
Powell's balancing approach confused the role of juror and Justice, the
role of legislator and Justice, and ultimately the role of citizen and Jus-
tice. Although the roles of juror, legislator, and citizen may call upon the
same virtues and values, the Justice must stand apart from all three and
from the community itself. He represents the Constitution to the commu-
nity, not the community to the Constitution.
I. WORKING THE BALANCE: JUSTICE POWELL AND THE
REPRESENTATIVE BALANCE
Representative balancing is marked procedurally by the consideration of
a wide range of interests with a stake in a particular decision.16 Substan-
tively, it aims to give voice to each interest by setting forth a rule that
accommodates all of them. Ideally, that rule allows each interest its maxi-
mum realization consistent with recognition of and respect for other com-
peting interests. Such a result can be described as a "balance" among
competing interests. Failure to reach that balance, or a shift in the nature
or strength of competing interests, results in a "disequilibrium," leading
to reconsideration and the drawing of a new balance at another point.
The theoretical foundations for this model of the judicial role were laid
in the writings of Pound and Cardozo in the early part of this century.17
Pound argues that the goal of law, including adjudication, should be to
"secure all interests so far as possible with the least sacrifice of the totality
of interests or the scheme of interests as a whole."18 Elsewhere, he ex-
plains, "I do not believe the jurist has to do more than recognize the prob-
lem . . . presented to him as one of securing all social interests so far as
16. Both courts and legislatures are subject to the charge that they systematically ignore certain
interests-particularly the poor and unrepresented. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 483 (1977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice Powell's opinion for its "distressing insensitivity to the
plight of impoverished pregnant women"); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 457 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing Court's insensitivity in Maher); see also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. Ra:v. 1281, 1310 (1976).
17. For a perceptive discussion of the roots of balancing in legal realism and American pragma-
tism, see Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 948-63, and see C. DucAT, supra note 15, at 119.
18. 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDF.NC- 334 (1959).
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he may, of maintaining a balance or harmony among them that is compat-
ible with the securing of all of them."'"
Although the theoretical foundation is old, no Justice prior to Powell so
clearly adopted the approach.20 Powell's acceptance of this approach,
however, is not based on the arguments of legal theorists. In fact, when
Powell explicitly reflects on the judicial role, he denies the Justice this
broad responsibility.2' Rather, Powell's attraction to the model lies in a
habit of personal governance.
22
Perhaps the most famous of Powell's opinions is that in Regents of Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke,23 concerning affirmative action in univer-
sity admissions programs. Typically, Powell finds himself squarely in the
middle. He is the deciding vote within a polarized Court and a polarized
national community. To hold that middle, he adopts the technique of rep-
resentative balancing.
Powell starts by embracing the interests of those burdened by affirma-
tive action plans. He rejects the argument that racial discrimination
against non-minorities should be subject to a weaker standard of constitu-
tional review than classifications that discriminate against blacks: "Racial
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for
the most exacting judicial examination."24 Since contemporary equal pro-
tection law has essentially identified "exacting" judicial scrutiny with ju-
dicial invalidation,' 5 Powell appears to accept the principle that the equal
protection clause protects every individual of every racial group against
any race-based burdens. In fact, he is doing no such thing.'
19. R. POUND, AN INTRODUc(rION "to "rHe PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 46 (1954); see also McDougal,
Some Basic Theoretical Concepts About International Law: A Policy-Oriented Framework of In-
quiry, 4 J. CONFIJCT'r RFsoL.IrrIoN 337, 343 (1960) ("The comprehensive community goals we rec-
ommend for postulation are. . . at highest abstraction, a public order which is designed to promote
the greatest production and widest sharing of all values. ... ); Pound, A Survey of Social Interests,
57 HARM. L. REv. 1, 39 (1943) ("[Llaw is an attempt . . to give effect to the greatest total of
interests or to the interests that weigh most in our civilization, with the least sacrifice of the scheme of
interests as a whole.").
20. Justices Harlan and Frankfurter, also closely identified with a balancing approach, fall more
clearly within the "zero-sum" model. See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text. For them, the
representative balance remains primarily a legislative responsibility. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 624 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 278 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Although this Article examines in detail only a sample of Powell's representative balancing opinions,
the list could easily be extended. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (due process
rights of institutionalized mentally retarded); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (rule on place
of illegitimate children in intestate succession); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (rule on
censorship of prisoner mail).
21. See infra notes 279-92 and accompanying text.
22. See Howard, supra note 3, at 448 (discussing Justice Powell's background within social class
of Virginia patriarchs).
23. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
24. Id. at 291.
25. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. RE.v. 1, 8 (1972)
(scrutiny "strict in theory" but "fatal in fact").
26. For a similar move with respect to the First Amendment principle of no content-based distinc-
[Vol. 97: 1
1987] Justice Powell 7
In the representative balance, principles are nothing more than markers
of interests.27 For Powell, claims of rights derived from principles are in-
distinguishable from the interests of any other individual or subgroup
within the social order. The principle of state "color-blindness" and the
corresponding claim to a right to non-discrimination, accordingly, become
a factional interest in equal treatment. Thus, Bakke gains nothing, as a
practical matter, from Powell's seeming recognition of a principle of color-
blindness. Bakke remains, for Powell, a representative of a faction, the
interests of which are to be balanced against the interests of competing
groups.
Having canvassed Bakke's interests, Powell then turns to the interests
of the school. His assessment of those interests locates one that must be
balanced against the color-blindness principle. The judicial balance must
give a place to the school's competing interest in "obtaining the educa-
tional benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body." 2
Formal doctrine requires that this interest be "compelling" if it is to
survive "exacting judicial scrutiny.""9 But Powell provides no serious ex-
planation of why this interest is of such a commanding constitutional
magnitude.30 Powell's support for the proposition that there is a link be-
tween the racial diversity of the student body and the quality- of higher
education consists of a single reference to a statement by the president of
Princeton in that school's Alumni Weekly."1 There is no consideration of
whether, or to what extent, educational quality should be sacrificed to the
constitutional principle of equal treatment. After all, nowhere does the
Constitution guarantee anyone a right to the highest quality education.
3
1
tions on speech, see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring), in which Justice Powell rejects Justice Stevens' position that non-obscene, sexually ex-
plicit speech is entitled to a lower standard of protection than other kinds of speech, yet nevertheless
permits a content-based intrusion on that speech by applying a balancing test. See also P. BOBBrr,
CONsnrrruiiONAt. FATrE 222-23 (1982) (on the "expressive" function of Powell's opinion in Bakke).
27. The denial of a distinction between rights and interests is an essential point in the realist
tradition. See R. DAHI., A PR.FAC(E "I*) DFMOtCRArIC: THEORY 90-119 (1956); M. EDELMAN, DEM-
OCKRATI( THEORIES AND THE CONsTITUION 96-97 (1984); J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIAL-
ISM AND DEMOCRACY 250-55 (1950).
28. 438 U.S. at 306. The University of California had advanced three other purposes for the
special admission program: "(i) 'reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in
medical schools and in the medical profession,' . . . (ii) countering the effects of societal discrimina-
tion; (iii) increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved
.... " Id. (citation omitted). Powell rejected as legally non-cognizable each of these purposes. Be-
cause the end of representative balancing is recognition and accommodation of competing factions,
however, there is no clear relationship between the number of interests recognized and the character
of the accommodation among factions that is reached.
29. See Gunther, supra note 25, at 13; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287.
30. There is some irony in the argument Powell presents. He finds support for affirmative action,
in the face of an equal protection challenge, in the First Amendment right of association. Of course, it
had been argued for twenty years that the desegregation principle supported by the Court offended
just this right of association. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARM. L. REv. 1, 34 (1959).
31. 438 U.S. at 312-13 n.48.
32. In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), Powell explicitly rejects
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Nor does Powell consider the importance of racial diversity relative to
other sorts of diversity. If non-racial diversity remains possible, what
stands to be lost in terms of educational quality if the principle of color-
blindness is followed?
33
Just as the assertion of a constitutional principle means nothing more
than judicial recognition of a "cognizable interest," so the characterization
of a state interest as "compelling" means nothing more than the recogni-
tion of a competing interest. In neither case is the characterization the
result of a serious legal examination or argument. Thus, the fact that di-
versity of student population is a "compelling" interest hardly means that
racial diversity can be pursued directly through the use of quotas. Terms
or categories that might serve as rules for decision-a principle of color-
blindness or the identification of a compelling interest-have become only
factional interests to be represented within the balance.-
Representative balancing always undermines such categorical rules, be-
cause its end is recognition and reconciliation, not exclusion. Bakke is crit-
ical to understanding the depth of Powell's commitment to this balance
because there he rejects the most firmly rooted of the Court's catego-
ries-strict scrutiny and compelling interest-as grounds for decision.35
Traditionally, identification of a compelling state interest marked a
boundary of judicial authority. A court was not to interfere with an inter-
est of compelling importance to the political branches. For Powell, how-
ever, identification of a "compelling" interest signifies only judiciial recog-
nition of an interest that must fit into a larger accommodation that gives
voice to competing interests.
Having located and articulated competing interests, Powell now works
the balance. Racial diversity, he tells us, may not be sought through a
system of a "prescribed number of seats set aside for each identifiable
appellee's contention that education is a "fundamental" right for the purposes of equal protection
analysis, id. at 30, and refuses to apply strict scrutiny to a claim of disparate treatment with respect to
educational opportunity.
33. Ignoring the specific issue of racial diversity, Powell writes that the University can claim a
First Amendment interest in the "right to select those students who will contribute the most to the
'robust exchange of ideas .... '" Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313. Powell cannot mean this literally. The
University of California is a public university, and at issue is a regulatory policy adopted by that
institution as a state actor. The First Amendment protects private parties from the reach of such
regulatory actions; it does not protect the state itself from the requirements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. RF:v. 1482, 1505 (1975).
34. The prevalence of balancing in equal protection cases has seriously eroded the more tradi-
tional classification system for judicial review. See infra note 154. Just as Powell's balancing ap-
proach in Bakke undermines the "compelling state interest standard," so the Court's balancing ap-
proach in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), undermines the
"rational basis" standard.
35. Balancing and a categorical approach could be combined by limiting balancing to particular
categories of state action or state interests. See Ely, supra note 33, at 1500-01. Powell does not
combine the two, but rather subsumes the categories within the balance. Categories do not mark the
boundaries of the balance, but are simply markers of interests within the balance.
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category of applicants.' '3 s Rather, it may only be accomplished by an indi-
vidualized consideration of each applicant in which "race or ethnic back-
ground may be deemed a 'plus.' " Each interest is given voice-both
equal treatment and racial diversity are affirmed.
Why, where, and how does the Constitution or constitutional law make
such distinctions between quotas and goals? Silence. Powell does not cite
any traditional, or even non-traditional, legal materials-text, precedent,
constitutional history, constitutional structure, or moral and political the-
ory2S-to support this balanced outcome. Instead, he tells us only that
Princeton and Harvard have managed under this system. That this may
be good policy or even good politics-at least in the Ivy League-does not
tell us why it is good adjudication.
3
9
This analysis represents a characteristic pattern in Justice Powell's ju-
risprudence. He welcomes every side to the controversy but resolves the
issue in a pronouncement that fails to appeal to anything beyond his own
intuition of a fair outcome. His use of the representative balance is analo-
gous to the legislative model of hearing, debate, and then closure of the
issue by the vote.4 Justice Powell sets the pattern for every university
admissions affirmative action program in the country, but we cannot ex-
plain the constitutional norms.41
This silence at the center means the rules that emerge are of uncertain
36. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
37. Id. at 317. Powell's representative balancing "methodology leads him to a standard of adminis-
trative discretion that might give others pause, given the history of abuse in this area. See, e.g., Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discretionary enforcement of licensing ordinance unconstitu-
tionally applied to Asians). In Bakke, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun can see no
constitutional distinction between the two approaches contrasted by Powell: "In any admissions pro-
gram which accords special consideration to disadvantaged racial minorities, a determination of the
degree of preference to be given is unavoidable, and any given preference that results in the exclusion
of a white candidate is no more or less constitutionally acceptable than a program such as that at
Davis." 438 U.S. at 378 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
38. See Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV.
L. RF~v. 1189, 1194-209 (1987) (discussing types of authority for constitutional arguments).
39. See G. CA.ABREST, ItDnA.-s, BEm.Ims, A-TirUDES AND THE LAW 90 & nn.324-31 (1985)
(discussing abuse of affirmative action goals in Ivy League schools).
40. It is also analogous to the decisionmaking process he assigns to the university admissions
officer, which he describes as follows: "lAin admissions program operated in this way is flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according
them the same weight." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. An admissions officer must equalize footings, but
may distribute weights-hardly the traditional language of legal rules. But this is precisely what
Powell is doing in Bakke itself. He is placing the competing interests of the parties on an equal footing
(both have cognizable claims that he acknowledges) and distributing weights-educational diversity
may be pursued at some cost to racial color-blindness.
41. In fact, all we can do is quote Justice Powell. The Yale Law School affirmative action policy,
for example, was explained to the admissions committee as follows: "Read Bakke." Powell's use of the
representative balance resembles Justice Frankfurter's description of the legislative process: "Matters
of policy . . . are by definition matters which demand the resolution of conflicts of value, and the
elements of conflicting values are largely imponderable. Assessment of their competing worth involves
differences of feeling; it is also an exercise in prophecy." American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash
& Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 557 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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weight and scope. Each new configuration of interests presents an occa-
sion for the formulation of a new rule. The proliferation of new rules
may, in turn, cause a reconsideration of the earlier rules. The post-Bakke
line of affirmative action cases has taken just this form. The Court faces
an endless series of variations; in each of these, it must reassess the com-
petitive interests and reconsider the adequacy of the old rule. The compe-
tition of interests in terminations,4' in promotions,4 and in set-asides4'
may each require a new balance.
The proliferation of rules produced by this methodology is well illus-
trated by Powell's opinion in Bellotti v. Baird,'5 which addresses the issue
of state regulation of a minor's access to an abortion. Roe v. Wade,"
where Powell joined the majority opinion, is itself an example of repre-
sentative balancing in which the Court accommodates the competing inter-
ests of mother and state by formulating a rule that gives voice to each.'7 In
Bellotti, the Court considers a Massachusetts law that requires a minor
desiring an abortion to seek the consent of both her parents. If that con-
sent cannot be obtained, she can go to state superior court and obtain
permission for the abortion by showing "good cause." The problem is to
adjust the rule of Roe to reflect this new configuration of interests.'8
Powell's analysis canvasses the various interests at stake: the child's in-
terest in asserting her constitutional right to an abortion; the parents' in-
terest in preserving parental authority, including the supervision of the
physical and moral "upbringing" of the child; and the state's interests in
protecting the child from ill-considered decisions and in encouraging
42. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Edue., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986) (plurality opinion) (striking
down collective bargaining agreement extending preferential treatment against layoffs to minority
employees).
43. See United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) (plurality opinion) (upholding a judicial
remedy of preferential promotions for minority employees).
44. See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. E.E.O.C., 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986) (up-
holding affirmative action in union membership program); see also Days, Fullilove, 96 YAL L.J.
453 (1987) (evaluating minority set-asides as remedy for racial discrimination).
45. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
46. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
47. See infra note 295. The use of trimesters to mark the balance of competing interests in Roe
has been the object of considerable academic criticism. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YAi.E L.J. 920, 924-25 (1973). The technical character of the lines
drawn, in particular, opened the opinion up to the same kind of institutional criticism that is directed
at administrative balancing by the Court. See Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v.
Wade, 95 YAI.E L.J. 639, 644-48, 655-58 (1986).
48. As in the affirmative action example, Roe has been followed by repeated reconsideration of the
balance as interests shift in diverse circumstances. The rule for adults is not that for minors, Bellotti;
the rule of recognition for parents is not that for spouses, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976) (portion of statute requiring spousal consent for abortions held unconstitutional); the rule
for state prohibition of abortions is not that for state discouragement of abortions, Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977) (state may constitutionally refuse to pay for nontherapeutic abortions); and the rule
for state burdens on the right to an abortion is not that for state actions that discourage the exercise of
the right, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315-17 (1980). This fact-specific approach to balancing
means that the lower courts receive little guidance from the decisions of the Supreme Court. No one
knows which rules will serve as stable precedents, which situations will serve as occasions for a new
rule, or which situations may serve as occasions for reconsideration of the initial rule of Roe itself.
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child-parent communication. The rule Powell sets forth provides a set of
guidelines designed to give voice to each competing interest within the
context of an individual request for an abortion.
Thus, the parents may not have an absolute right to bar the abortion,
but they are assured that a decisionmaker will consider whether the par-
ticular circumstances require their involvement for an appropriate resolu-
tion. The minor is not given an unrestricted right to an abortion but is
assured that the decisionmaker will consider the strength of her claim that
she is sufficiently mature to make the decision, as well as her claim that
the decision should be made without parental notification. Finally, the
state is assured that its interest in encouraging parental communication
will be recognized. 4' Each faction gets something, but no one faction gets
everything.
A detailed set of guidelines emerges for a system of state regulation of
minors seeking abortions. Where does any of this come from? Once again,
simply from Justice Powell.50 He does not rely on, or even refer to, objec-
tive legal resources at any point in his discussion of these guidelines.51
Massachusetts was trying to satisfy its interest in efnsuring parental notice
and involvement in the decision of a minor to abort, while meeting the
demands of Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,52 which held that a state
could not grant the parents an absolute veto over that decision. Massachu-
setts had itself sought to balance the constitutional right of the minor, on
the one hand, against parental and state interests, on the other. Yet the
only precedents that Powell cites in his discussion of whether Massachu-
setts had reached a proper balance are Danforth itself, simply to repeat its
holding,53 and Roe-for the trivial point that pregnancy creates a "poten-
tially severe detriment.""M
Bakke and Bellotti illustrate a particular approach to the representative
balance. Voice is given to all competing interests both at the appellate
level of formulating abstract guidelines or rules and at the moment of
49. The plurality opinion also advances the state's interest in improving the quality of decisions.
Powell does not, however, acknowledge a state interest in discouraging abortions by minors-an indi-
cation of the selective character of interest recognition in balancing. That this is not an "illegitimate"
interest is clear from Maher. While accumulation of interests may not matter when they are parallel
or mutually supporting, here the state's interests are in significant tension. Powell provides a more
comprehensive list of the interests to be balanced in this context in H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,
419 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
50. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 656 n.4 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)
(accusing Powell of rendering an "advisory opinion").
51. Cf Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 445 (1984). Bennett
distinguishes "objectivity" from "authoritativeness" in constitutional law. A decision is "objective"
when it appeals to sources outside of personal values of the decisionmaker. "Authoritativeness" re-
quires distinguishing among these "objective" resources in terms of some normative criteria of
correctness.
52. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
53. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 639.
54. Id. at 642.
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application of those rules in the individual case. 5 The general rule formu-
lated in each case calls for an individualized decision process in which
each interest is considered. Representative balancing, however, may also
take the form of settling on a rule that is designed to accommodate com-
peting claims in general, without further acknowledgement of those claims
at the moment of individual application. 6 The Court's treatment of libel
law illustrates this form of representative balancing.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,57 Powell applies the technique of the
representative balance to determine the extent of First Amendment protec-
tion, if any, to which a publisher is entitled when it publishes defamatory
falsehoods concerning a private individual involved in matters of "public
concern."55 Writing for the Court, Powell formulates the issue as that of
defining "the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and
the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment."'"
The method of "accommodation" is that of the representative balance.
55. Powell frequently appeals to this model of particularistic decisonmaking. See, e.g., Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (plurality opinion) (balancing state regulatory
interests against burdens on interstate transportation); Argersinger v. Hamlin, *407 U.S. 25, 51 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring in result) (arguing for exercise of judicial discretion in appointment of attor-
neys for indigent defendants in misdemeanor cases); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (right to
speedy trial determined by ad hoc balancing).
56. Much of the balancing literature addressing the controversy associated with Justices Black
and Frankfurter attempts to distinguish between two levels of balancing: an abstract level of articula-
tion of constitutional principle-variously called "exegetic" or "deinitional"-and a concrete level at
which the actual interests involved in the particular case are weighed. See Frantz, 71 YALE L.J.,
supra note 15, at 1434-35; Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on The Supreme
Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. R.v. 755 (1963); Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to
Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935,
942-45 (1968). These works generally approve of abstract balancing to determine rules of general
applicability, but disapprove of concrete, or ad hoc, balancing because it is inevitably infected with
subjective preferences. The distinction, however, is not very helpful as an analytic device to explore
the balancing methodology. The nature of the balancing enterprise is such that it can be applied at
any level of generality from the most concrete to the most abstract. Traditional models of equitable
relief, for example, present balancing in the most concrete terms. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189, 217 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (using equity model). But
balancing of abstract constitutional categories or principles is also standard fare for the Court. Each
model of balancing that I describe can occur at any level of abstraction, and the same problems arise
at each level. Thus, representative balancing occurs at an abstract level in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), but a concrete level in Keyes. Similarly, Powell pursues zero-sum balancing
at an abstract level in United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), but at a more
concrete level in his dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting). Finally, there is nothing in the administrative balance of Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), or Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981), that
itself dictates the level of generality at which the balance should be applied. In Mathews, for example,
it is unclear whether the balance should be applied to the class of all welfare applicants or to each
individual applicant. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 49-52 (1981) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
57. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
58. Id. at 325. The balancing debate in constitutional law has long focused on the First Amend-
ment. See, e.g., Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doc-
trine-Some Fragments of Histor, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975); Linde, 'Clear and Present Dan-
ger' Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970); and
works cited supra note 15.
59. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325.
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Once again, Powell canvasses the competing interests: "The need to
avoid self-censorship by the news media is . . not the only societal value
at issue."60 Alongside this interest is that of the libeled individual in re-
ceiving compensation "for the harm inflicted .. .by defamatory false-
hood." ' This interest, Powell writes, is particularly strong here because
private individuals, unlike public officials or public figures, do not have
much access to the media to "counteract false statements," 2 nor have they
invited media attention and comment by thrusting "themselves to the fore-
front of particular public controversies." '63 From this, Powell concludes
that "private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than pub-
lic officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery." 4
This constellation of competing interests therefore requires a different
"accommodation" than that between the press and state libel law achieved
in New York Times v. Sullivan. 5 Instead of the "actual malice" and
"reckless disregard" standard of that case, Powell concludes for the Court
that the appropriate rule in Gertz precludes: (1) liability without fault;
(2) presumed damages; and (3) punitive damages in the absence of know-
ing falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. Correspondingly, state libel
law can establish liability for mere negligence and can permit awards to
compensate actual injury. 8 The interests of each competing faction are
thus recognized, given voice, and accommodated.
Representative balancing at the level of general rules is no more stable
than representative balancing at the level of concrete interests. As circum-
stances change, the weights assigned to the variety of interests change and
thus the balance, expressed in the general rule, changes. The Gertz rule is
different from the Sullivan rule, which is different yet again from the rule
Powell supports in the recent case of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc.,7 which involves a private person and "no issue of
public concern."68 Each new variation among the competing interests re-
quires a new balance.
The central place of representative balancing in Powell's work is evi-
dent once again in his treatment of school desegregation. In his opinion in
Keyes v. School District No. 1,6" he argues that the Court should abandon
60. Id. at 341.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 344.
63. Id. at 345.
64. id.
65. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
66. Gertz, 418 U.S. 345-47.
67. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
68. Under those circumstances, Powell adopts a rule that allows presumed and punitive damages
on a showing of less than actual malice. Id. at 761-63.
69. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Keyes, the Court's first desegregation decision dealing with a northern
school system, holds: (1) that only de jure segregation, "a current condition of segregation resulting
from intentional state action," violates the equal protection clause, id. at 205; (2) that "a finding of
intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system . . . creates a
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the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation of public schools:
"Public schools are creatures of the State, and whether the segregation is
state-created or state-assisted or merely state-perpetuated should be irrele-
vant to constitutional principle." ' From this argument he concludes that
there should be an affirmative constitutional obligation to desegregate all
public school systems.
This conclusion appears, at first, to stand on a principle insulated from
a balance of competing interests. In fact, this principle requiring desegre-
gation is no more secure than his stand for color-blindness in Bakke. Jus-
tice Powell makes this clear in his vision of the appropriate remedy for a
failure to desegregate. Once again, Powell appeals to the representative
balance:
[W]ith school desegregation, reasonableness would seem to embody a
balanced evaluation of the obligation of public school boards to pro-
mote desegregation with other, equally important educational inter-
ests which a community may legitimately assert. 1
Remedial interests, accordingly, must be balanced against other "educa-
tional interests which a community may legitimately assert. "72
Powell then ranges freely over a variety of concerns that might, if em-
pirically sound, support his assertion that neighborhood schools are supe-
rior to the alternatives in metropolitan area-wide desegregation plans. He
fails, however, to explain why these competing "community aspirations
and personal rights '73 are of constitutional significance. Local schools may
be traditional and may even represent good public policy, but there is no
constitutional right to attend a local community school. Further, even if
presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious," id. at 208; (3) that
this presumption can be rebutted by proving that the government's actions had no segregative intent or
that past government acts did not "create or contribute to the current segregated condition." Id. at
211. Powell concurs in that part of the holding which requires system-wide desegregation of the
Denver school system, but disagrees with the reasoning of the majority opinion. Id. at 217 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also takes a dramatically different view of what reme-
dies a court might order for the constitutional violation. Id. at 240-52.
70. Id. at 227.
71. Id. at 240. In this context, Powell writes:
The relevant inquiry is "whether the costs of achieving desegregation in any given situation
outweigh the legal, moral, and educational considerations favoring it. . . IT]he Constitution
should not be held to require any transportation plan that keeps children on a bus for a
substantial part of the day, consumes significant portions of funds otherwise spendable directly
on education, or involves a genuine element of danger .... "
Id. at 240 n.19 (quoting Comment, School Desegregation After Swann: A Theory of Government
Responsibility, 39 U. CHI. L. R.v. 421, 422, 443 (1972)). The suggestion that the constitutional
problem can be reduced to a cost/benefit problem demonstrates the connections between the represen-
tative and administrative balances.
72. Powell is somewhat ambiguous in Keyes on the appropriate level of generality at which this
balancing is to occur. While he seems generally to recommend ad hoc balancing "under [the] circum-
stances" of the particular case, 413 U.S. at 244, much of his opinion is a discussion of the appropriate
balance of interests in school desegregation remedies in general, see, e.g., id. at 248-52.
73. Id. at 242.
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Powell is correct in his assessment of possible costs, no one has suggested
that constitutional remedies are cost-free. Powell fails once again to draw
any distinction between kinds of interests, rights, or values. The failure to
focus on or explain the constitutional interest transforms the right to a
remedy into simply an interest in desegregation. This interest, however, is
just one among many, all of which must be given voice and balanced.74
Powell elaborates on this position in his dissent in Columbus Board of
Education v. Penick,75 and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman .7
In both of these cases, the Court upholds lower court orders requiring
system-wide desegregation plans designed to terminate and dismantle the
continuing effects of the earlier operation of a dual school system.
The Court's approach to school desegregation remedies, Powell argues,
"ignores other relevant factors in favor of an exclusive focus on racial
balance in every school." 77 For Powell, the overriding goal is "to have
quality school systems." 8 The right to a remedy becomes, in Powell's
mind, simply an interest in diversity within the schools-"ethnic and ra-
cial diversity in the classroom is a desirable component of sound education
in our country of diverse populations. '7' That interest in diversity, how-
ever, exists wholly apart from a judicial finding of a constitutional viola-
tion. With that, constitutional law as a unique social function articulating
a unique institutional perspective simply disappears.
Once Powell conceives of the remedial right as one interest among
many, striking the appropriate balance among competing interests be-
comes a matter of social policy. The problem of doing justice to remedy a
past wrong is thus displaced by the contemporary task of accommodating
competing interests to achieve a "quality education."8
At the heart of each of these examples of the representative balance is
an intuition, not an argument. The accommodation of qualitatively dis-
tinct, competing interests is accomplished through an intuition of what is
reasonable and fair. That intuition is contingent upon both the particular
pattern of competing claims and the character of the decisionmaker. Be-
74. In the seminal title VII case, Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), the Court
recognizes but excludes from consideration the effects of remedial, retroactive or competitive seniority
on the expectations of third-party co-workers. Id. at 774-79. Notably, Powell laments the majority's
refusal to weigh the interests of third-parties in fashioning the title VII remedy. Id. at 787-91 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
76. 443 U.S. 526 (1979). Powell also joins Justice Rehnquist's dissent, arguing that the Court
erred in finding a constitutional violation of system-wide effect. Id. at 542-44 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
77. 443 U.S. at 484 (Powell, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 486.
79. Id.
80. See Chayes, supra note 16, at 1298-302, discussing an emerging model of public law litiga-
tion that shifts its focus from relief for past wrongs to the creation of an "affirmative regime of
conduct [which] is pro tanto a legislative act." Id. at 1302. Chayes introduces a model of "negotia-
tion" among the parties at trial to legitimate this judicial result. Id. at 1313-16.
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cause character and situation, not argument, shape the rule of accommo-
dation, there is an inarticulate quality to the resolution of conflict in each
case. The outcome is without explanation.
In this method of decisionmaking two characteristic forms of traditional
legal argument-the "slippery slope" and the use of precedent-lose their
force.81 Both forms of argument present informal tests of a principle of
decision against a norm of objectivity. The "slippery slope" argument tests
judicial willingness to adhere to a proposed principle for decision in a
series of hypothetical, hard cases. 2 The argument based on precedent asks
a judge whether that principle of decision can explain past actions of the
court.8 The former points to the future; the latter to the past."
In Powell's view, the absence of these forms of argument creates no
danger, because his own moderation, his own reasonableness under all the
circumstances, provides the security that no extremes will be reached in
the name of judicial consistency. 5 The line can always be redrawn to
reflect new circumstances. Each case, then, produces an ad hoc rule with
no past and an uncertain future. Without explanation or justification,
each outcome remains at risk. Its longevity is a function of Court person-
nel rather than of the institution itself.
In the context of representative balancing, a stand on principle becomes
an obstinate narrowness, a refusal to acknowledge competing interests.8 6
The balance does not invite argument, but rather subsumes all disagree-
ment. It does so by recasting every assertion of principle into merely an-
other competing interest. There is no constitutional high ground; all par-
81. A "slippery slope" argument appears in Bakke where Powell rejects the claim that the equal
protection clause grants a higher level of protection to "particular racial or ethnic minority" groups.
438 U.S. at 295-99. Such a claim is rejected because it would require of judges an endless "variable
sociological and political analysis," id. at 297, of each minority group. The rule that emerges from
Bakkte, however, is based on a balance which may have effectively the same result. Thus, the slippery
slope argument does not play any role in the effective holding of the cases. But see Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1847 (1986) (plurality opinion) (Powell, J.) (rejecting role-model
theory of affirmative action because it "has no logical stopping point.").
82. On slippery slopes, see Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 382 (1985) ("A
slippery slope argument. . . emerges as an appeal that forces decisionmakers to focus on the future
implications of what they do today."); Wechsler, supra note 30, at 15.
83. On precedent, see Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM.
L. REv. 982, 988-89 (1978); Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L.
REv. 1 (1979); Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1043 (1975).
84. But see Shauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L.J. 571 (1987) (arguing that a system of precedent
points equally to the future).
85. For an examination of the self-regulating, institutional character of the Court as a legislative
body, see Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 16 (1978) ("Such
an institution would be ultimately accountable in the same way that an individual is ultimately ac-
countable-not by process of external assessment but by the process of self-judgment and self-
control.")
86. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 240 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("[Overzeaousness in pursuit of any single goal is untrue to the tradition
of equity and to the 'balance' and 'flexibility' which this Court has always respected.").
[Vol. 97: 1
1987] Justice Powell
ticipants in the debate are leveled and thus reconciled by authority, not by
reason.
8 7
The measure of success of the representative balance is not to be found
in reasoned criticism, but in political stability. A successful balance would
leave all interested parties sufficiently satisfied to end the process of seek-
ing an equilibrium. The troubled history of the examples discussed here
suggests that this equilibrium is not easily achieved. Indeed, it cannot be
achieved because such stability would imply that the underlying process of
political and social change has itself ceased. As long as interests continue
to develop and change, stability can only be located in a process of deci-
sionmaking and not in a particular substantive outcome.
Powell seems to pursue this political stability directly by employing a
methodology that itself gives voice to what might otherwise appear as
"losing" interests."8 Powell as Justice can play a role similar to that
played by minority participants in the electoral and legislative process.
Participation in the process may itself serve to hold the whole together by
reconciling disfavored interests with their position in the actual outcome.89
This model of adjudication casts the Court in a managerial role-it
must manage the' constant interplay of competing interests. While I later
argue that this is an illegitimate role for the Court,90 the important point
here is that it is an unrealistic role for the Court.
The very fact that a Justice constructs the rules of factional accommo-
dation may make it less likely that such an equipoise will be reached.' 1
Each moment of judicial balancing represents a rejection of the accommo-
87. See Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1035-40 (1984) (comparing
"levelling democracy" and "dualist democracy").
88. See A. BICKI., Poi.rric-S AND rHe WARREN COURT 184 (1965). According to Bickel:
[Tihe heart of democratic government. . . is that it rests on consent. And the secret of consent
is only in part a matter of control, of the reserve power of a majority to rise up against
decisions that displease it. It is, perhaps more importantly, the sense shared by all that their
interests were spoken for in the decision-making process, no matter how the result turned out.
Id. Michelman identifies this as an important feature of a balancing approach in his discussion of
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1324 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting): "Justice O'Connor's use of such balancing displays both its reconciliatory
spirit and its dialogic force: she can acknowledge as 'unquestionably' real and legitimate the major
interests asserted by the losing party . . . ." Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (1986) (citation omitted);
see also Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 487-89
(1984) (discussing "dialogic exchange" as a way of achieving consent).
89. After Bakke, for example, non-minority candidates may continue to be denied entry by univer-
sity admissions officers, but now under a system that appears to treat them "equally." 438 U.S. at
317-18.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 106-27.
91. Recognizing this tension in the social perception of a judicial balancing approach, Greenwalt
writes, "Open interest weighing alone may provide some reassurance [to losing litigants and the larger
community], but observers unsympathetic with the result may believe that the judge's finger is on the
scales." Greenawalt, supra note 83, at 1000; see also Frantz, supra note 15, 51 CALIF. L. REV. at
749 ("[Hlow can the losing litigant look at balancing language and feel any assurance that the judge
succeeded in keeping his personal preferences out of his 'scales'? How can the public do so? How can
the judge himself do so?").
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dation achieved among those same interests in the political institutions of
government. The Court must convincingly explain why its accommodation
should be authoritative. It must do so, moreover, to those who were suc-
cessful in the realm of majoritarian politics. Those unhappy with the
Court's result-starting with the dissenters in the Court itself-will al-
ways charge judicial usurpation of a legislative function. Further, the lack
of articulate principle will always be an easy object of attack. A represen-
tative balancing approach, then, is likely to be undermined by challenges
from both directions: more politics, pressing for reevaluation of competing
interests, and more principle, pressing for reasoned explanation.
Administrative balancing represents, at least in part, a response to this
challenge.
II. WORKING THE BALANCE: JUSTICE POWELL AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE BALANCE
The representative balance views each controversy as raising a unique
cluster of competitive interests. Its aim is to accommodate qualitatively
incommensurable interests. Each variation in circumstances changes the
nature or strength of the competing interests and thus presents a new oc-
casion for rule creation. Balancing remains a metaphor for an intuitive
adjustment of interests. The administrative balance, on the other hand,
seeks a method of accommodating interests that substitutes technique for
intuition. Each new occasion for adjudication is understood not as an op-
portunity for adjustment of a rule but rather as an opportunity for the
rule's application.
Two characteristics mark administrative balancing. First, the standard
by which the balance is accomplished must be described at a level suffi-
ciently abstract to allow for repeated application to diverse controversies.
Second, application of those standards requires an objective task of mea-
surement, not an exercise in normative judgment. Quantitative measure-
ment, rather than reconciliation of qualitative conflict, is the task of the
administrative balance. Administrative balancing aims to transform adju-
dication into a process of applying a common objective measure to con-
flicting interests. 2
The representative balance translates rights into interests; the adminis-
trative balance goes a step further and suggests that these interests are
quantifiable. The paradigmatic model of administrative balancing is cost/
benefit analysis. It provides an abstract standard capable of quantitative
application to diverse controversies.
9 3
92. See J. MASHAW, DUE PR(X:l- S IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 100-01 (1985) (describing
move in due process analysis from model of "appropriateness" to one of "competence" as move from
"suspicious silence" at heart of constitutional adjudication to "general, rational, and transparent
rules").
93. There is no necessity that administrative balancing take the form of cost/benefit analysis. In
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If Bakke is Powell's most important opinion, Mathews v. Eldridge,'9 is
surely a close second. While Bakke exemplifies the representative balance,
Mathews typifies the administrative balance. Powell's use of the tech-
nique, however, is hardly limited to issues of procedural due process."5
Mathews concerns the procedural due process requirements that attach
to the termination of social security disability benefits. Relying on the
Court's holding in Goldberg v. Kelly,'" that the due process clause re-
quires an "evidentiary hearing" prior to any termination of welfare bene-
fits, respondent successfully argued in the lower courts that similar proce-
dures must be followed prior to termination of disability benefits.
97
Powell's opinion for the Court recognizes both that some form of process
is due prior to the termination and that a hearing is required prior to a
final termination. The question is whether to extend the hearing rule of
Goldberg to the initial decision to terminate disability benefits-a decision
already subject to a hearing on appeal.
To answer that question, Powell first canvasses the competing interests:
"[R]esolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided
here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental
and private interests that are affected."' 8 The end of this inquiry, how-
ever, is no longer an intuitive accommodation. Instead, the argument turns
dramatically to the administrative balance, explicitly appealing to a cost/
benefit model:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally re-
quires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private inter-
est that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-95 (1983), for example, Powell argues that application of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause can rest on "objective" factors of comparison that do not appear
"economic." See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44-66 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)
(applying multifactoral analysis); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (borrowing from cost/benefit
model).
94. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
95. Powell often applies an administrative balance to issues of criminal procedure. For example,
concurring in Argersinger, he argues for administrative analysis of an indigent's right to counsel. 407
U.S. at 44-46. Argersinger was followed quickly by Barker, in which Powell, writing for the Court,
applies the administrative technique to the right to a speedy trial. 407 U.S. at 515. Powell reaffirmed
Barker's approach in United States v. Loud Hawk, 106 S. Ct. 648, 655-56 (1986). Some of Powell's
most important opinions apply the same method of analysis to determine the scope of federal habeas
review. See infra text accompanying notes 157-75.
96. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
97. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323-26.
98. id. at 334 (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 335; cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), in which Justice Harlan analyzes
the due process issues raised by a divorce statute in terms of the interests of the individual litigant,
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Borrowing from the work of Richard Posner,1"O Powell suggests an eco-
nomic calculus to work the balance. The costs of the present sys-
tem-determined by the value of the private interest multiplied by the
probability of error under current procedures-is to be measured against
the net benefits that would accrue from an increase in procedural protec-
tions-determined by the decrease in error costs which, in turn, is dis-
counted by the additional procedural costs.101 Both characteristics of ad-
ministrative balancing are evident: first, an abstract structure for working
the balance in all due process cases; second, application of that structure
through quantification of competing interests.
Like the intuitive accommodation in representative balancing, this
model of objective measurement is intended to give appropriate recogni-
tion to each interest. In theory, the ideal accommodation of all competing
interests would be reached through repeated application of the three-fold
calculus to each possible procedural innovation. The optimal result would
be the set of procedures that could neither be increased nor decreased
without incurring additional costs. As it appears in an individual case,
however, administrative balancing asks only* whether the benefits of the
particular procedure at issue outweigh the costs.
Cost/benefit analysis appeals to Powell, because it promises objectivity
in assessing and comparing competing interests. That promise, however, is
far from fulfilled. The Mathews calculus necessarily ignores all those in-
terests that cannot be assigned hard values.10 2 What, for example, are the
dignitary costs of being forced to accept welfare, and where does this fac-
tor figure in the analysis?
If such interests are not to count, we need more of an explanation than
the statement that they are difficult to quantify. The move from represen-
tative to administrative balancing was not intended to eliminate competi-
tive interests but only to provide an objective means of comparison. If
objectivity can be achieved only by failing to give voice to certain interests,
the technique undermines its own justification.
Even the interests that are included in the calculus are not really capa-
ble of any hard economic measure. Powell admits that projections of the
rejecting both the cost arguments of the state, id. at 382, and the suggestion that the procedures need
only be adequate to the general class of affected individuals. Id. at 379-80.
100. See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J.
LEAL Srr. 399, 401 (1973) ("Error costs . . . may here be regarded as the product of. . . the
probability of error and the cost if an error occurs.. .. The increment in error costs must be com-
pared with the direct costs of a hearing.").
101. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340-49. For a critique based on the Court's avoidance of questions of
value, see Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976).
See also J. MASHAW, supra note 92, at 121-26 (discussing problems of Goldberg-Mathews
calculations).
102. See Mashaw, supra note 101, at 46.
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probability of error, in this single case, vary between 58.6% and 3.3%. 1°3
This leads Powell to conclude that "[blare statistics rarely provide a satis-
factory measure of the fairness of a decisionmaking process. ' 10 4 Although
this is true, it necessarily undermines the objectivity for which Powell had
turned to administrative balancing.
Powell implicitly recognizes the limits of cost/benefit analysis when he
tempers the whole approach with the following condition: "In assessing
what process is due in this case, substantial weight must be given to the
good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the ad-
ministration of social welfare programs that the procedures they have pro-
vided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals."
10 5
Surely this does not follow from the cost/benefit model itself. If costs and
benefits can be measured, then there is no place for deference. The accu-
racy of the calculation, not the identity of the calculator, is the only value
implicit in the methodology.
There can be two reasons for this deference. First, deference may be
appropriate because judicial intervention in legislative or administrative
policy may itself entail costs. One of the competing interests that must go
into the balance is the interest in preserving the authority of the political
institutions of government. This authority is undermined whenever a stat-
ute or regulation is declared unconstitutional. This cost of judicial inter-
vention, however, is precisely the kind of soft cost that the administrative
balancing of Mathews sought to avoid.
Second, deference may be appropriate because the courts are no better,
and perhaps worse, at assessing costs and benefits than the bureaucracy. If
there is no reason to prefer the calculation of the courts, then something
more than disagreement on the outcome of the calculus is necessary to
justify judicial intervention. 0 If the reason that the courts are no more
likely "to get it right" than the bureaucrats or politicians is that there is
no right answer, then the calculation cannot itself justify displacing the
result of the political process.
Both of these reasons point to a fundamental problem with the method-
ology. The administrative balance described in Mathews is nothing other
103. 424 U.S. at 346 & n.29. Powell's assessment of other costs and benefits in the opinion are
equally soft. See, e.g., id. at 347 ("No one can predict the extent of the increase fin costs], but...
experience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate additional
cost . . . would not be insubstantial"); see also J. MASHAW, supra note 92, at 115 ("The model of
competence has an enormous appetite for data that is disputable, unknown, and, sometimes,
unknowable.").
104. 424 U.S. at 346.
105. Id. at 349.
106. Of course, there may be special circumstances in which the courts are more likely to get the
cost/benefit analysis right. Certain constitutional provisions-including, most importantly, the dor-
mant commerce clause-can be interpreted as requiring judicial evaluation of costs and benefits pre-
cisely because of structural characteristics that may prejudice the political calculations. See infra note
118.
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than an account of the rule that a rational administrator would follow.
That judicial recalculation under that same rule does not adequately ex-
press the Court's constitutional role is vividly demonstrated in Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp.,107 in which the Court considered the
constitutionality, under the dormant commerce clause, of Iowa's ban on
65-foot double tractor trailer trucks.108 Powell's plurality opinion in Kas-
sel starts by asserting that "a State's power to regulate commerce is never
greater than in matters traditionally of local concern," and that a "strong
presumption of validity" attaches to local safety regulations.1 0' But this
categorical approach rapidly gives way:
Regulations designed for that salutary purpose [local safety] never-
theless may further the purpose so marginally, and interfere with
commerce so substantially, as to be invalid under the Commerce
Clause. . . . This "weighing" by a court requires-and indeed the
constitutionality of the state regulation depends on-"a sensitive con-
sideration of the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern in
light of the extent of the burden imposed on the course of interstate
commerce."
110
Working this balance, according to Powell, requires measurement and
comparison of the regulation's incremental benefits to highway safety and
the additional costs it imposes on interstate trucking. Thus, the judge must
evaluate expert testimony on the safety of 65-foot doubles with respect to
time required to pass; ability to back up; likelihood of jackknifing; ability
to brake, turn, and maneuver; production of splash and spray; and finally
susceptibility to "off-tracking" and wind."' All of these become "constitu-
tional facts"-facts that the Supreme Court must itself reconsider because
they are determinative of the constitutional issue. 1 2 The cumulative result
of these determinations must then be "balanced" against the $12.6 million
in additional costs incurred each year by the trucking companies as a re-
sult of the Iowa regulation. 13
The practical difficulty of this judicial assessment is graphically demon-
strated by the fact that the hearing in the trial court consisted of fourteen
107. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
108. The dormant commerce clause has spawned numerous approaches. See, e.g., Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (balancing local interest against burden on interstate commerce);
South Carolina v. Barnwell, 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (commerce clause prohibits discrimination against
interstate commerce); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) (only Con 7
gress can regulate subjects "in their nature national," or which "admit only of one uniform system, or
plan of regulation"). In Kassel itself there is no majority opinion; three different approaches to the
dormant commerce clause are presented.
109. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 670-71 (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 672-75.
112. On the similar "constitutional fact" doctrine in First Amendment law, see Bose Corp. v.
Consumer Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 506-11 (1984).
113. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 674-75. Presumably the $12.6 million is also a constitutional fact.
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days of conflicting expert testimony. This sort of proceeding in the trial
courts is precisely what Powell envisions and encourages in his opinion." 4
This position, however, is rejected by a majority of the Court."1 5 Justice
Brennan, concurring separately, Writes that "[t]he courts are not empow-
ered to second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the
utility of legislation."' 16 Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, writes that under
the dormant commerce clause:
The Court does not directly compare safety benefits to commerce
costs and strike down the legislation if the latter can be said in some
vague sense to "outweigh" the former. Such an approach would...
arrogate to this Court functions of forming public policy, functions
which, in the absence of congressional action, were left by the Fram-
ers of the Constitution to state legislatures." 7
Brennan and Rehnquist, with the majority of the Court, believe that
the role of the Court cannot be simply to consider again those factors that
should inform a rational public policy choice by the political deci-
sionmakers. A difference in cost/benefit calculations cannot justify judicial
intervention, because judicial "second-guessing" is not based on a claim of
greater expertise." 8 They suggest further that even if the claim to exper-
tise were plausible, the institutional role is wrong: Constitutional adjudi-
cation, even in the area that most readily lends itself to economic analy-
sis-the dormant commerce clause-cannot simply be a matter of
114. Thus, Powell distinguishes Raymond Motor Transp. Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978), on
the ground that the state there failed to make a "serious [enough] effort to support the safety rationale
of its law." Kassel, 450 U.S. at 671.
115. justice Brennan's concurring opinion was joined by justice Marshall. justice Rehnquist's
dissent was joined by Chief justice Burger and justice Stewart.
116. Id. at 679. Brennan also invokes a balance, but instead of measuring the local benefits
achieved by the state statute, he measures the importance of the "local benefits actually sought to be
achieved by the State's lawmakers. ... Id. at 680. He asks only whether the legislature could
rationally have believed the measure would promote its intended purpose and thus avoids the fact-
finding involved in justice Powell's approach. He does not explain how he would balance the in-
tended benefits against the actual costs.
117. Id. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 679 (Brennan, J., concurring). In Kassel, the argument can be made that even if
Powell's framework of analysis and that of the state legislature are the same, because the costs fall
primarily outside of the state, the legislature's application of that framework will be distorted. See
Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (1940); Eule, La)ing the
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YAi.E L.J. 425, 438-43 (1982); Tushnet, Rethinking the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125, 134-35. While the facts of Kassel provide some
support for such an argument, they do not provide sufficient support. First, the Iowa legislature had
consistently agreed to application of national standards on its highways. In this case, the governor had
vetoed a bill that would have brought Iowa up to that standard. 450 U.S. at 666 n.6. There is no
reason to think that in the normal political process of the state, which is open to the influence of the
trucking companies, the issue would not be repeatedly reconsidered and perhaps resolved differently.
Second, Powell's cost/benefit analysis is the same as that which a rational Congress, or federal admin-
istrative agency, would apply. Congress can address substantial burdens on the nation's highway sys-
tem. In fact, shortly after Kassel, Congress did just that, requiring states to accept the larger double-
tractor trailers in order to receive federal highway funds. Surface Transportation Assistance Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 127, 96 Stat. 2097, 2123-24 (1983).
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displacing the numerical calculations of the state legislatures with those of
an unelected Court.
Not only is Powell's approach in Kassel rejected by a majority of the
Court, but it also exhibits the same problem of internal inconsistency evi-
dent in the analysis of Mathews. Once again, cost/benefit analysis forces
Powell to ignore those interests that cannot easily fit within the social
utility balance of the economist. Thus, Powell's opinion fails to address
what was obviously the true interest behind Iowa's regulation. Iowa had
declined to act as a bridge linking East and West because there is a direct
relationship between the amount of traffic on its highways and the num-
ber of accidents and injuries that occur in the state." 9
The real issue in the case is whether Iowa has a constitutional obliga-
tion to assume its "fair share" of the national highway fatalities. Put dif-
ferently, does Iowa have to value out-of-state lives in the same way that it
values resident lives? This is surely not an easy question when one consid-
ers the myriad ways in which a state limits benefits-for example,
schools, health care, police services-to its own residents. Curiously, a
majority of the Court recognizes the issue, but fails to reach a single reso-
lution of it.120 The issue cannot appear in Powell's balancing of costs and
benefits, however, because there is simply no way to discuss this concept
of a "fair share" within this methodology. 21
Mathews and Kassel are natural products of the balancing approach
that characterizes Powell's judicial decisionmaking. That process is always
subject to the charge that the accommodation of interests upon which the
balanced outcome depends represents nothing more than the Justice's per-
sonal value choices. 22 To escape this charge of subjectivity, there is inevi-
tably a search for techniques that introduce objectivity, and particularly
quantification, into the balance.1 23 The social utility function captured in
119. To the degree that Iowa participated in an economic market in which 65-foot trucks serviced
its own community, Iowa allowed both in-state and out-of-state interests to use such trucks. Only the
trucker just "travelling through" was denied entry.
120. This issue emerges clearly in both Brennan's opinion, Kassel, 450 U.S. at 686 ("Iowa may
not shunt off its fair share of the burden of maintaining interstate truck routes, nor may it create
increased hazards on the highways of neighboring States in order to decrease the hazards on Iowa
highways.") and Rehnquist's opinion, id. at 706 ("If a neighboring State chooses not to protect its
citizens from the danger discerned by the enacting State, that is its business, but the enacting State
should not be penalized when the vehicles it considers unsafe travel through the neighboring State.").
121. Powell indirectly approaches the subject when he speaks of "discrimination": The suspicion
of intentional state discrimination against out-of-state interests should lead the Court to give less def-
erence to the state's legislative assessment of costs and benefits. Id. at 675-78. But to say that Iowa is
"discriminating" is to assume a legal conclusion, without analyzing the issue of whether Iowa may
seek to protect the lives of its citizens over those of other states.
122. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1952) (Black, J., concurring); J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DitRUSmr 44-48, 63-70 (1980); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV.
865, 878 (1960).
123. Linde identifies this tension in what I have called the representative balance: "The dilemma
of the realist tradition lies in confusing a theory of critical description with a theory of judicial action.
Realism sees the norm as the product of the institution. But the institution must, by the logic of its
own legitimacy, see its action as the product of the norm." Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist
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the model of cost/benefit analysis seems to offer just such a non-subjective
principle of aggregation.124 It is, therefore, extremely attractive to
Powell. 125
If the move to objectivity through quantification of values were truly
feasible, however, the application of constitutional norms could be left to
bureaucrats. 12  Ironically, the more colorable the claim that the norm can
be quantified, the more the Justice is open to charges of usurpation of
legislative or administrative tasks. The Justice is remaking a decision that
has already been made, but he cannot show that he is making it "better."
This is the lesson of Kassel, in which a majority of the Court rejects the
administrative balance of Powell's plurality opinion.
If the Justice is doing something other than remaking that decision,
balancing costs and benefits is not a revealing way of characterizing that
role. Balancing costs and benefits may remain a form of rhetoric behind
which a majority may coalesce, but it is not itself the basis of decision.
This is the lesson of Mathews, in which economic analysis quickly gives
way to institutional deference.
Powell turns to administrative balancing as one form of response to the
problems of representative balancing. In place of an intuitive accommoda-
tion of qualitatively distinct interests, he proposes a technical task of
quantification and comparison. This method of balancing, however,
presents a new set of problems that are as severe as those it was meant to
resolve.
1 27
If quantification cannot solve the problems of judicial accommodation of
interests, then perhaps the idea of accommodation itself must be aban-
doned. Zero-sum balancing introduces an alternative model of judicial res-
olution of conflict among competing interests.
Tradition, 82 YAI.p. L.J. 227, 252 (1972).
124. I do not mean to suggest that cost/benefit analysis is the only possible source of judicial
objectivity. On the contrary, the startling lack of other sources of judicial objectivity-precedent, his-
tory, constitutional text and structure, and political and moral theory-in Powell's opinions is a major
theme of this essay. See Bennett, supra note 51. What is particularly attractive about cost/benefit
analysis for Powell is the direct link of quantification to a balancing methodology.
125. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-89 (1976) (discussed infra at note 175); see
also supra note 71 (discussing Keyes).
126. The fact that the Supreme Court has so often itself had to apply the Mathews balancing test
indicates that the balance is substantially less quantifiable than it might appear. See, e.g., Lassiter v.
Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (counsel for indigent parents in proceeding to termi-
nate parental status); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (blood test for indigent father in paternity
suit); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (removal of a child from foster
home); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (revocation of driver's license). Accordingly, the adminis-
trative balancing rule is simultaneously a rule of decision for the lower courts and for the Supreme
Court. The Court may treat itself as the "administrator" of its own self-imposed rules.
127. My critique of cost/benefit analysis has focused particularly on whether this method can
satisfy the demands which Powell places upon it. More elaborate discussions of the role of cost/benefit
analysis in constitutional argument, particularly in the framework of the Realist tradition, can be
found in B. ACKERMAN, RE.UONrRU(-.TNt; AMERICAN LAW 78-94 (1984); J. MASHAW, supra note
92, at 113-41; Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 974-75; Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empiri-
cal Social Science: From The Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 459 (1979).
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III. WORKING THE BALANCE: JUSTICE POWELL AND THE ZERO-SUM
BALANCE
The zero-sum balance is the model typically associated with the asser-
tion that constitutional rights are "not absolute." The process of recogniz-
ing an exception to a general constitutional norm is described as a process
of balancing: The Court must determine whether competing interests
"outweigh" the norm. The controversy is framed such that the choice is
exclusive: either the norm or the exception is recognized, but not both.
A classic expression of the zero-sum balance is found in the debate over
First Amendment jurisprudence between Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan, on one side, and Justice Black, on the other.12 Black argued that
government restrictions on speech could not be justified through an appeal
to countervailing interests. The First Amendment, he argued, was an ab-
solute restraint on government and not an invitation to the Court to bal-
ance competing governmental interests against an assessment of the im-
portance of free speech. Harlan and Frankfurter, on the other hand,
argued that the extent of the burden on free speech and the importance of
the governmental interests had to be balanced.
The goal of that balance was not reconciliation of competing interests,
but resolution of conflict through a judicial choice. Frankfurter, for exam-
ple, summarized his view:
To state that individual liberties may be affected is to establish the
condition for, not to arrive at the conclusion of, constitutional deci-
sion. Against the impediments which particular governmental regu-
lation causes to entire freedom of individual action, there must be
weighed the value to the public of the ends which the regulation may
achieve.12
Learned Hand captured this balancing metaphor in a formula adopted by
Chief Justice Vinson: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity
128. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
129. Communist Party, 367 U.S. at 91; Frankfurter expressed a similar view in Konigsberg.
As regards the questioning of public employees relative to Communist Party membership it
has already been held that the interest in not subjecting speech and association to the deter-
rence of subsequent disclosure is outweighed by the State's interest in ascertaining the fitness
of the employee for the post he holds, and hence that such questioning does not infringe consti-
tutional protections. Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399; Garner v. Board of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716. With respect to this same question of Communist Party membership,
we regard the State's interest in having lawyers who are devoted to the law in its broadest
sense, including not only its substantive provisions, but also its procedures for orderly change,
as clearly sufficient to outweigh the minimal effect upon free association occasioned by compul-
sory disclosure in the circumstances here presented.
Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 52.
[Vol. 97: 1
Justice Powell
of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free




In each of the cases, the claim was made that an assertion of govern-
mental authority violated the First Amendment interests of some individ-
ual or group.1" 1 The Court responded by weighing the relative merits of
the governmental interest and the individual's First Amendment interest.
One interest would be held to "outweigh" the other and that interest
alone would be given force and effect. Thus, while representative balanc-
ing aims at an outcome in which there are no winners or losers, zero-sum
balancing seeks to produce clear winners and losers."3 2
Powell's treatment of the conflict between the interest of the press in
free access to criminal proceedings and that of the defendant in excluding
the press is a good example of his use of the zero-sum balance. Each side
appeals to a constitutionally guaranteed right: the press, to a First
Amendment right; the defendant, to the right to a fair trial. In his concur-
rence in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,'3 3 Powell describes this conflict of
interests:
The right of access to courtroom proceedings . . is not absolute. It
is limited both by the constitutional right of defendants to a fair trial
and by the needs of government to obtain just convictions and to
preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information and the identity
of informants ....
In cases such as this, where competing constitutional rights must
be weighed . . . the often difficult question is whether unrestrained
exercise of First Amendment rights poses a serious danger to the
fairness of a defendant's trial.""
In this last paragraph, Powell writes of "striking this balance" between
contrasting and competing constitutional rights. The language is typical:
Choice is framed as an issue of "weighing;" balancing is required because
130. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,
212 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.)).
131. Although I mention the First Amendment rights of "groups" along with individuals, the
group interest was regularly translated into the interests of individual members. See, e.g., NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458 (1958) ("We think that petitioner argues more appro-
priately the rights of its members . . ").
132. Indeed, one of the objections to judicial balancing was that the communists always lost, while
the NAACP always won. See Frantz, supra note 15, 71 YALE L.J. at 1441-42.
133. 443 U.S. 368, 397-403 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 398-99 (citations omitted). In Gannett, the majority did not reach the issue of a First
Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings, holding only that the press and general public had
no right of access under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 384-93. In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Court, with Justice Powell not taking part, held that the First Amendment
does provide a right to attend criminal trials, despite the defendant's motion for closure. See also
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (right of access to voir dire proceedings
despite objections of defendant and prosecution); Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596
(1982) (First Amendment right of access to criminal trials does not preclude closing trial where there
is a real risk of psychological damage to a minor).
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constitutional rights are "not absolute." The decision requires recognition
of the "weightier" interest.
135
One does not have to go beyond Powell's argument in Gannett to raise
substantial questions about the accuracy and function of the balancing
metaphor in this context.1 s6 Powell describes the problem of the case as
follows: "unrestrained exercise of First Amendment rights poses a serious
danger to the fairness of a defendant's trial." 37 This is no doubt true. But
a "balanced" view of the two constitutional principles involved would re-
quire equal recognition of the other side of the problem: Unrestrained
exercise of the defendant's right to a fair trial may pose "a serious dan-
ger" to the press's First Amendment rights.
If the competing claims cannot coexist, it is not obvious that the First
Amendment right must yield to the right to a fair trial. The alternative,
after all, is not to convict the defendant after an unfair trial, but rather to
forgo the trial. That a defendant must be released to preserve a constitu-
tional value is hardly an oddity in our legal system.133 The real question
of the case is which constitutional right we should value more highly.
Which right should yield, and when?
The balancing metaphor could point us, and the Court, toward this
problem of a choice among values,113  but it can also be used to avoid
explicitly focusing on that issue."4 The latter more accurately character-
izes Powell's approach. To justify outcomes simply by employing the rhet-
oric of balancing suggests that assessing the value of competing interests is
not problematic. In fact, determining values is the only problem.
The problem of determining values is well illustrated in Powell's recog-
nition of a competing, and apparently compelling, interest of the prosecu-
tion in obtaining convictions and preserving confidentiality. Here, we are
dealing not with a competing constitutional interest but rather with a
criminal enforcement interest of the state. While this is surely a legitimate
135. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 398.
136. See Fried, supra note 56, at 777. Fried describes the problem the Court faces in allocating
competencies between institutions such as the press and the criminal courts and concludes: "The bal-
ancing test, unless much more fully elaborated, is a most unhappy formulation of that role, raising-it
would seem-unjustified hopes, and-one can only wish-unnecessary apprehensions." Id.
137. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 399.
138. Consider, for example, the results of the exclusionary rule, the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, or the legislative privilege.
139. Mendelson defends balancing on just such grounds:
Open balancing compels a judge to take full responsibility for his decisions, and promises a
particularized, rational account of how he arrives at them-more particularized and more ra-
tional at least than the familiar parade of hallowed abstractions, elastic absolutes, and selective
history. Moreover, this approach should make it more difficult for judges to rest on their
predispositions without ever subjecting them to the test of reason.
Mendelson, supra note 15, 50 CALIF. L. RE~v. at 825-26. But cf. Frantz, supra note 15, 51 CAIF. L.
REv. at 748-49. See also Michelman, supra note 88, at 34 (describing particular balancing approach,
although presumably not all such approaches, as "communicative practice of open and intelligible
reason-giving as opposed to self-justifying impulse and ipse dixit").
140. Professor Henkin notes perceptively that "balancing seems to emerge as an answer instead of
a process, and the metaphor of balancing as the whole message." Henkin, supra note 15, at 1048.
[Vol. 97: 1
Justice Powell
interest, so, according to Powell, is the interest of the press. The issue is
precisely when should the constitutionally protected rights of the press
yield to competing interests? The metaphor of the balance does not tell us
anything about how to answer this question.
Powell's answer in Gannett, therefore, reflects nothing more than his
starting point: The First Amendment interest must yield to the competing
interests. 1" The metaphor of balancing, however, effectively masks the
choice that accounts for the outcome. Balancing suggests a process of rea-
soning, when in fact there is nothing in his argument but a choice among
conflicting claims.
A case from Powell's first term further illustrates his use of the zero-
sum balance and its masking quality. In United States v. United States
District Court,'42 the Court considers whether there should be an excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for domestic security
wiretaps. Powell describes the problem as one of resolving a zero-sum
balance:
As the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its terms, our task is to
examine and balance the basic values at stake in this case: the duty
of Government to protect the domestic security, and the potential




On one side, Justice Powell perceives the "needs of citizens for privacy
and free expression . . . protected by requiring a warrant before such
surveillance is undertaken."'" On the other side, he sees the possibility
that "a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts of Gov-
ernment to protect itself from acts of subversion and overthrow .... 11,145
The latter interest is given a constitutional dimension as well: "[T]he most
basic function of any government is to provide for the security of the indi-
vidual and of his property.'
' 46
Powell develops this tension in some detail. He describes the historical
foundations and reasons behind the Fourth Amendment's warrant re-
quirement concluding that "unreviewed executive discretion may yield too
readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook poten-
tial invasions of privacy and protected speech.1 147 However, he also can-
141. See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing
a balancing approach to the conflict "between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to
give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct"). Once again, a "fair balance" for Powell
subordinates the press interest whenever there is a "legitimate need" within the criminal proceeding.
142. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
143. Id. at 314-15.
144. Id. at 315.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 312 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (White, J., dissenting)).
147. Id. at 317.
1987]
The Yale Law Journal
vasses the government's claims that prior judicial review in this area
would (1) "obstruct the President in the discharge of his constitutional
duty to protect domestic security;" " " (2) exceed the competence of the
courts;' 4' and (3) endanger domestic security by creating a danger of
leaks.' Thus, the Court again confronts a conflict between two seem-
ingly compelling, yet mutually exclusive, constitutional interests: Either
domestic security outweighs personal privacy or it does not.
Having set forth the conflict, the Court's task is to establish a hierarchy
of values. Without such a hierarchy, the equipoise could not be broken.
But instead of addressing this problem, Powell works the balance simply
by asserting judicial authority to decide: "We recognize . . the constitu-
tional basis of the President's domestic security role, but we think it must
be exercised in a manner compatible with the Fourth Amendment. In this
case we hold that this requires an appropriate prior warrant proce-
dure."'' Why does the balance come out this way?' 5 '
Powell offers no explanation. He does explicitly reject the government's
claims with respect to judicial competence and the danger of leaks. They
offer no weight to balance against the Fourth Amendment privacy inter-
est. But he fails even to treat the critical first point in the government's
position-that the warrant requirement will "obstruct" the presidential
duty to protect domestic security."" Thus, he fails explicitly to address the
critical question in the case: how much presidential obstruction to suffer
for the sake of individual privacy, or how much of an intrusion on indi-
vidual privacy to suffer for the sake of domestic security?
Once again, the rhetoric of balancing masks an exercise of raw judicial
power. The metaphor, moreover, obstructs a clear vision of the process of
choice. It focuses attention on the outcome rather than on the premises
that make the outcome possible." The image of the Justice as "balancer"
148. Id. at 318.
149. Id. at 319.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 320.
152. Powell's assertion that the President's domestic security role must be exercised "in a manner
compatible with the Fourth Amendment" is hardly more than a tautology. Whatever the Court de-
cides in the case is the measure of such compatibility.
153. Perhaps this is why he conditions his conclusion with the ambiguous phrase "in this case,"
which can mean either in the context of domestic security wiretaps or on the showing of obstruction in
these particular circumstances.
154. In equal protection doctrine, the priority of valuation over balancing has been recognized in
the Court's reliance on formal standards of review: the "rational basis" and "compelling state inter-
est" tests. Both tests recognize that the outcome turns on the issue of valuation. The former reduces
the problem of value to a trivial issue by assuming that any legitimate state interest is adequate; the
latter makes the problem so serious as to be virtually insurmountable by positing that virtually no
legitimate interest is sufficiently "valuable." Powell's opinion in Bakke represents a serious assault on
this function of these standards, because he asserts that one fairly routine interest of the
state-diversity of a medical school class-is "compelling." The function these categories serve in
eliminating the need for comparative evaluations suggests that traditional equal protection doctrine




suggests that the weights to be balanced are presented to the Justice, and
that they exist prior to, and apart from, the choice of outcome. A close
analysis of the balancing argument, however, finds a lack of judicial re-
sources with which to support a hierarchy of values and even a failure to
inquire into that hierarchy. 1"
A final example of the zero-sum balance demonstrates the underlying
connections between the variety of forms of balancing as deployed by Jus-
tice Powell. In Stone v. Powell,'" the Court considered whether state
court exclusionary rule holdings are reviewable in federal habeas corpus
proceedings.1 57 Powell framed the question as whether the "policies be-
hind the exclusionary rule are . . . absolute,"1 ' and concluded that they
are not: "[T]hey must be evaluated in light of competing policies." 59 The
alternatives were seen as mutually exclusive. Habeas review was either
available or it was not.
The analytic problems of the zero-sum balance decrease as one side of
the balance approaches zero. For just that reason, Powell concentrates on
arguing that the only interest furthered by the exclusionary rule is deter-
rence of "future unlawful police conduct," 6 and that this interest is not
advanced by federal habeas review. Accordingly, he rejects both the claim
that the exclusionary rule represents "a personal constitutional right,"161
and the claim that it advances an interest in "judicial integrity." 6 ' To be
balanced against the de minimis benefit to deterrence, then, are the costs
of habeas review to the "truthfinding process," to punishment of the
guilty,163 to judicial resources, to respect "for the law and administration
of justice,"'" and to the interest in minimizing friction between the state
and federal systems of justice. 65 Thus, "[oin collateral attack, the exclu-
sionary rule retains its major liabilities while the asserted benefit of the
rule dissolves."' " With one side approaching no weight at all, the balance
is clear. 67
155. Compare United States District Court with Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). In his
opinion for the Court in Fitzgerald, Powell applies the technique of the zero-sum balance to the claim
that the President is absolutely immune in civil damages actions arising out of his official conduct.
Powell writes that "before exercising jurisdiction [over the President]," a court "must balance the
constitutional weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and
functions of the Executive Branch." Id. at 754. The balancing of presidential functions against indi-
vidual protection from executive misconduct in Fitzgerald, however, produces precisely the opposite
result from that of United States District Court.
156. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
157. See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
158. Stone, 428 U.S. at 488.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 484.
161. Id. at 486.
162. Id. at 484.
163. Id. at 490.
164. Id. at 491.
165. Id. at n.31.
166. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 269 (Powell, J., concurring).
167. Powell takes the same approach to the question of whether challenges to the composition of a
19871
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Powell's employment of the zero-sum balance, however, provides a rad-
ically incomplete account of the grounds of decision. Focus on deterrence
as the sole benefit of the exclusionary rule cannot explain the exception
the Court recognizes for cases in which the state did not provide an op-
portunity for full and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment issue at
trial."" Nor does Powell respond to Justice Brennan's argument that the
claim of de minimis benefits ignores a variety of factors, such as the in-
creased likelihood that state courts will adhere to constitutional rules in
the face of possible habeas review, 1" the strengthening of stare decisis,'70
and the need for judicial deference to congressional decisions71 -benefits
wholly apart from the issues of "judicial integrity" and "personal
rights. 172 In the absence of a consideration of these factors, moreover, the
opinion seems unresponsive to the arguments of both Justice Brennan and
Justice White that Mapp v. Ohio,173 which applied the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings, controls this case: As
long as Mapp remains good law, they argue, federal habeas review must
be available.17'
The dissents' objections suggest the need for a second look at Powell's
argument to see how he reconciles Mapp and Stone.'" Reconciliation, for
Powell, is not to be found in any simple principle given effect by both
cases, but by a change in perspective. Powell understands the two cases as
parts of a larger whole. From this more general perspective, the problem
grand jury can be brought in federal habeas actions. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 585-88
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (claims of discrimination in grand jury composition
should not be cognizable in federal habeas cases because costs of habeas review to "society, our system
of justice, and our federal fabric" are not outweighed in these circumstances by benefits traditionally
associated with habeas relief-i.e., freedom of an innocent individual).
168. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 481-82, 494.
169. Id. at 520-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 522.
171. Id. at 525-26.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 155-62.
173. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
174. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 537 (White, J., dissenting).
175. Initially, Powell appeals to the technique of the administrative balance to reconcile Mapp
and Stone. Thus, he casts the balance in Stone in cost/benefit terms: "IT]he answer is to be found by
weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to collateral review
. . . ." Id. at 489. Stone is distinguished from Mapp through quantitative measurement of the rele-
vant costs and benefits. Brennan's accusation that Powell ignores a variety of factors in performing
this calculation suggests again the unstable foundation of the administrative balance. Brennan further
condemns the move by which Powell reconciled Stone and Mapp as follows:
This denigration of constitutional guarantees and constitutionally mandated procedures, rele-
gated by the Court to the status of mere utilitarian tools, must appall citizens taught to expect
judicial respect and support for their constitutional rights. Even if punishment of the 'guilty'
were society's highest value-and procedural safeguards denigrated to this end-in a constitu-
tion that a majority of the Members of this Court would prefer, that is not the ordering of
priorities under the Constitution forged by the Framers ....
Id. at 523.
Cf. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 54 (1979) and the disagreement between Powell, id. at 588, and the
majority, id. at 557-58, over costs and benefits of habeas review of charges of discrimination in grand
jury selection.
Justice Powell
is to accommodate the competing interests of the criminal defendant and
the larger community. Together, Stone and Mapp give voice to each fac-
tional interest. The accommodation is to make federal review of the state
court decision available in direct but not in collateral proceedings. Thus,
the seemingly exclusive outcome, the choice of the "weightier" interest in
Stone, is only an appearance that results from an artificial narrowing of
perspective.
Understanding Stone as a part of an intuitive accommodation of con-
flicting interests explains the strained quality of Powell's argument assess-
ing the weights of the conflicting interests. The intuition that drives his
analysis is not that deterrence is the only relevant interest advanced by the
exclusionary rule, but rather that the criminal defendant has already got-
ten his "due." This intuitive sense of justice explains the one exception to
the no-review rule of Stone-an exception that cannot be explained in
terms of the deterrence rationale. Habeas review remains available where
the state did not provide an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the
Fourth Amendment claim, even though an occasional denial of such an




This move from a zero-sum to a representative balance is typical of
Powell's methodology. Each particular outcome can be recast as-a moment
within a larger effort to accommodate all the competing interests. For ex-
ample, while in Gannett Powell works the balance to require exclusion of
the press from pretrial proceedings, he simultaneously reveals a larger vi-
sion of a judicial accommodation of the press and the criminal justice sys-
tem. For Powell, precisely because Nebraska Press Association v. Stu-
art177 protects the press against gag orders, in Gannett the Court can be
more attentive to the interests of the criminal justice system than to those
of the press. Thus, while Justice Blackmun finds in Nebraska Press a
precedent,11 8 Powell sees it as a counterpoint to be balanced against the
resolution in this case. 11' The effort to balance, in other words, keeps a
kind of running ledger. The balance sheet becomes the model of justice.
This backdrop of representative balancing also lies behind Powell's re-
cent dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,'80
which overruled National League of Cities v. Usery.181 These cases also
176. Cases after Stone have shown an increasing enthusiasm for cost/benefit analysis in determin-
ing the scope of the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)
(court must weigh "the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case in chief of
inherently trustworthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached
and neutral magistrate that ultimately is found to be defective."). For a critique of that analysis, see
Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YAt." L.J. 906, 916-18 (1986).
177. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
178. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 440-46 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
179. Id. at 400.
180. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
181. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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involved resolution of a conflict between competing constitutional princi-
ples: Congress' Article I authority over interstate commerce versus state
sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment and general principles of
federalism.
Confronted with that conflict in National League of Cities, the Court
came down on the side of state sovereignty. For at least four members of
the majority, that choice was not based on a balance, but on a theory of
the constitutional priority of federalism. They understood federalism to be
a first principle of the American constitutional system, which could not be
slighted by a congressional choice under an indeterminate grant of consti-
tutional authority.182 That theory of constitutional structure is rejected by
the Court in Garcia.
In his Garcia dissent, Justice Powell describes this act of judicial choice
as a "familiar type of balancing test." 183 The task of that balance is to test
the strength of the national interest at stake against the "injury done to
the States if forced to comply,""1 and to choose, in each case, the weight-
ier interest.
In seeking a justification for National League of Cities through balanc-
ing, Powell distinguishes himself from both the old plurality and the new
majority. 85 Both disavow a judicial role in making comparative assess-
ments of different federal and state interests.18 ' Despite the raging battle
over first principles of American federalism, Powell offers no answer to
the question of how the Court can make the comparative assessments re-
quired to work the balance he suggests.1' 7
182. Justice Blackmun, while joining the majority opinion, also wrote separately. In his concur-
ring opinion, he expressed some nervousness over what he was joining: "I may misinterpret the
Court's opinion, but it seems to me that it adopts a balancing approach . . . ." 426 U.S. at 856. As
an interpretation of Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in National League of Cities, this was clearly
wrong. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 579 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (rejecting Powell's description of
National League of Cities as adopting a balancing approach). Nevertheless, as the fifth vote for the
majority opinion, Blackmun introduced the concept of balancing to this area. That concept was regu-
larly cited in the pre-Garcia cases, in which the National League of Cities minority plus Blackmun
consistently formed a majority to reject state claims of federalism limits on national authority. See
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 237 (1983); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S.
678, 684 n.9 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 n.29
(1981).
183. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 562.
184. Id. at 563 n.5.
185. Although Powell is joined by Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, Rehnquist specifically
distances himself from the balancing approach. See supra note 182.
186. For the Garcia majority, in the absence of a principled basis for assigning such values,
balancing should be left to the political branches. 469 U.S. at 552 ("State sovereign interests. . . are
more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than
by judicially created limitations on federal power."). In support of this position, the majority cites two
classic works: J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-84
(1980); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of The National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954). 469 U.S. at 551 nl.11 .
187. Powell does cite The Federalist Nos. 17 (A. Hamilton) and 46 (J. Madison) in support of
the high value he places on state and local government. 469 U.S. at 571. He fails, however, to cite The
Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison) on local government as a source of the factionalism that has destroyed
previous democracies. Furthermore, the issue is not whether state and local governments are valuable
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Powell's appeal to the zero-sum balance in Garcia, however, must be
interpreted in light of his understanding of the cases that followed Na-
tional League of Cities.'" For Powell, the entire line of cases constitutes a
process of accommodating competing federal and state interests. Only
from the more general perspective that encompasses all of the cases can
one perceive the managerial role of continuous accommodation that Pow-
ell assigns to the Court."" All of the cases together constitute a "bal-
anced" outcome, which in total gives voice to both federal and state inter-
ests. Only from the perspective of the single case does the balance appear
to produce winners and losers.
Similarly, in United States District Court, Powell concludes by inviting
Congress to draft regulations to govern the warrant requirements for do-
mestic security wiretaps.1 90 The case itself, he suggests, should be simply
one step in a larger process of accommodating, rather than excluding, the
government interest. 1
Behind Powell's use of the zero-sum balance, then, stands the represen-
tative balance. This representative balance is spread out over time and the
individual case becomes simply a moment in a longer process. This tem-
poral expansion is itself a consequence of those characteristics of represen-
tative balancing identified earlier-specifically, the rejection of- precedent
and slippery slopes as forms of legal argument."'
The twin concepts of precedent and slippery slope remove the indivi-
dual case from the ordinary course of political and social history. The case
is seen as an ordering event that simultaneously recasts history and deter-
mines the future. In representative balancing, however, the case loses this
atemporal quality; it becomes simply a moment within the ordinary
course of time. This loss dramatically affects the Justice's own under-
standing of the temporal character of his task.
Instead of understanding judicial intervention as an extraordinary
event, Powell perceives it as entirely ordinary. Because nothing is ever
settled, every area of controversy requires constant judicial supervision.
The unit that defines the Court's role is no longer the single case; rather,
the process of adjudication is spread out over time. Cases are related to
institutions within the American polity, but how to assess the relative merits of the interests of the
federal government when they are in conflict with those of state and local government.
188. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982);
United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Recl. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
189. See 469 U.S. at 562 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Having thus considered the cases out of
context, it was not difficult for the Court to conclude that there is no 'organizing principle' among
them.").
190. 407 U.S. at 322-24.
191. Even the rule of absolute presidential immunity in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)
(discussed supra at note 155), fits within a larger accommodation of the various competing interests:
Fitzgerald retains access to administrative relief, while the President is responsible to Congress and to
history. Id. at 757-58.
192. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
1987]
The Yale Law Journal
each other not as precedent to application, but as elements of a single
pattern of accommodation.
Nowhere is this more evident than in Justice Powell's deciding votes in
Parham v. Hughes19 3 and Caban v. Mohammed."" These cases, decided
on the same day, involve the rights of fathers of illegitimate children in
situations in which the state recognizes maternal but not paternal rights.
In Parham, Powell votes to uphold a state law that denies the father of an
illegitimate child, whom he has not legitimated, the right to sue for
wrongful death."' In Caban, Powell votes against a state law permitting
an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the adoption of their
child by withholding consent. To try to explain these votes by distinguish-
ing the cases is to miss the point of representative balancing.'" Together,
the cases give voice to the interests of the unwed father; together, they give
voice to the competing claims as well. They are pieces of a single whole.
Accordingly, Powell's zero-sum balancing is silent because it cannot be
explained on its own terms. It rests upon the representative balance that is
at the heart of the judicial task for Powell. What appears at first to be a
weighing and selection of interests in the individual case reveals itself as
part of a broader, intuitive accommodation of conflict; it points to the in-
corporation of a "temporal spread" into adjudication through representa-
tive balancing.
This movement through the different forms of balancing illustrates the
underlying unity of the different modes of balancing for Justice Powell.
For him, all forms of balancing are united in the assumption that conflict
is always between competing interests, that claims of principle or right
can be reduced to claims of factional interest and that the point of consti-
tutional adjudication is reconciliation. 17
The only principle to which Powell can adhere, given this understand-
193. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
194. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
195. 441 U.S. at 359 (Powell, J., concurring).
196. Powell distinguishes the cases by focusing on the availability of "a simple, convenient mecha-
nism by which the father of an illegitimate child" can legitimate the child in Parham and the absence
of any similar procedures available to the unwed father to gain rights comparable to those of the
mother in Caban. Parham, 441 U.S. at 360 (Powell, J., concurring). For arguments on why the
procedure in Parham serves no legitimate state purpose, see id. at 362-68 (White, J., dissenting), and
on why the discrimination against men in Caban does serve such purposes, see Caban, 441 U.S. at
407-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Most important, in each case the Court confronts an individual
claimant who does not meet the stereotype of the "unwed father" which the statutes envision. In each
case, the father had been involved in the support and raising of the child. In Caban, Powell is respon-
sive to the claims of the involved father; in Parham, he is not. See id. at 411-12 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (critizing Powell in Caban for judging a "general classification" by virtue of its arbitrary effect
"in an isolated case").
197. If zero-sum balancing collapses ultimately into representative balancing, then arguably the
two irreducible forms of balancing for Powell are representative and administrative. As argued above,
these represent essentially a contrast between an intuitive and a quantitative approach to the problem
of accommodating conflicting interests. The central place of this conflict is suggested in Fiss, The
Death of the Law? 72 CORNELL L. RE. 1, 15 (1986) (contrasting Critical Legal Studies' "particular-
istic" approach to adjudication with law and economics "instrumental" approach).
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ing of the nature of social conflict, is that of accommodation. Although
accommodation is the virtue of the representative balance, 1" it is not in-
herent in, or a necessary aspect of, judicial balancing. A Justice of the law
and economics school, for example, might find the administrative balance
to be primary, 1" while a Justice of the "preferred freedoms" school might
find the zero-sum balance to be the primary meaning of balancing.20
If the primacy of representative balancing is not a necessary part of a
balancing approach, then the reasons for Powell's position must be found
not in methodology but in substance, in his understanding of the end of
constitutional law. Section IV analyzes the vision Justice Powell brings to
constitutional adjudication, and the connection between that substantive
vision and his methodological approach. In the final section, I examine the
strength of that vision as a foundation for judicial review.
IV. BALANCING AND THE DEFENSE OF THE STATUS Quo
Although a representative balancing approach always leaves open the
possibility of redrawing the balance, there are still substantive themes to
the work of Justice Powell. The most apparent theme is the protection of
local government.' 0 1 Because this theme is so prevalent, one key, to under-
standing Justice Powell's vision of constitutional adjudication is an in-
quiry into those circumstances under which Powell works the balance to
defeat the interests of local government. Focusing on the exceptions pro-
vides a richer understanding of the general approach. The vision that
emerges is peculiarly well captured by the adjective "balanced," because it
seeks to preserve the existing distribution of authority among competing
factions of the community. There is, in other words, a deep connection
between the methodology of representative balancing and the values that
are given form and effect in that process.
In 1974, Powell joined the majority in Village of Belle Tere v.
198. The primacy of representative balancing within Powell's methodology corresponds to that of
the legislature more generally. If the problem of social order is to accommodate competing interests,
then legislative techniques and institutions will be most important.
199. See, e.g., Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Desiiox.Making, 4 INT'L REV. L
ECON. 131, 132 (1984).
200. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946), Justice Black envisions such a balance: "When we balance the Constitutional
rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion... we
remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position." Id. at 509.
201. His enthusiasm for local government is vivid in his dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting). It appears again in his description
of the interests that enter the balance in the areas of criminal procedure and federal habeas review,
see, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44-66 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), in the recognition afforded ad-
ministrative costs and convenience in the due process balance, see, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 347-49 (1976), and in his concern for local school board autonomy in the school desegregation
cases, see, e.g., Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 217 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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Boraas,20 2 which held that a small, suburban village could exclude house-
holds of more than two unrelated persons. Justice Douglas, writing for
the Court, rejected the claim of a group of college students that they were
constitutionally entitled to live together as a household, declaring that the
zoning regulation was a legitimate attempt to maintain a community in
which "family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clean air" predominate.20
Two years later, Powell wrote the plurality opinion in Moore v. City of
East Cleveland,204 in which the Court held unconstitutional a similar
zoning ordinance. Powell rejects the argument of the lower court that the
holding in Belle Terre should be determinative of the outcome in Moore:
"[O]ne overriding factor sets this case apart from Belle Terre. The ordi-
nance there affected only unrelated individuals. 2 5 East Cleveland, on
the other hand, defined a permissible family unit to exclude households
consisting of certain relatives, including that of a grandparent living with
grandchildren who were cousins rather than siblings.
To protect the family, Powell argues, "this Court must examine care-
fully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent
to which they are served by the challenged regulation. ' '2 " To explain this
judicial balance of family interests against those of local government, Pow-
ell appeals to the formulation of Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman:
The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court's
decisions [due process] has represented the balance which our Na-
tion, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual,
has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society
... . The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this
country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions
from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke. 07
202. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
203. Id. at 9. Douglas saw the alleged overinclusiveness-some students could live together with-
out offending these values-as an unfortunate but necessary consequence of legislative line-drawing:
"[Wihen it is seen that a line or point there must be, and that there is no mathematical or logical way
of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very
wide of any reasonable mark." Id. at 8 n.5 (quoting Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
204. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
205. Id. at 498 (emphasis in original). Powell's opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Blackmun. Brennan and Marshall, dissenters in Belle Terre, could consistently defend the indi-
vidual choice of living arrangements in both cases. Justice Stewart, id. at 531-41, and'Justice White,
id. at 541-52, thought the issue the same as in Belle Terre, but sided with the local government in
each case. Blackmun was the only other Justice, participating in both cases, who seemed to agree with
Powell that the cases were distinguishable. Justice Stevens, who joined the Court between the Belle
Terre and Moore decisions, saw an important distinction between transient and non-transient resi-
dents, rather than family and non-family households. Id. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 499.
207. Id. at 542-43 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissent-




Powell has suddenly cast the issue of the case at the highest level of the
judicial enterprise. The balance defended by Powell is to be the defining
balance of our political and social life.208 Powell, writing only for a plu-
rality, does not hesitate to strike that balance.2 '"
In fact, Powell fundamentally recasts the balance that Harlan pursued.
For Harlan, the concept of balancing referred to the juxtaposition of an
individual claim to a protected liberty interest against the competing inter-
ests of the society considered as a collectivity.21 0 Balancing was the method
of charting the limits of a liberal society's legitimate claims on the individ-
ual.2 Balancing, therefore, was most at home in the area of the First
Amendment, the constitutional rights that most directly protect the indi-
vidual from the demands of the community. Powell's balancing, however,
focuses not on the conflict between the individual and the society, but on
the structure of the social order itself, on the competing claims of institu-
tions and factions to articulate the values of the community.
The critical issue in Moore is not whether the family deserves some
protection, but whether every variation on the extended family deserves
priority over the city's interests. Addressing this issue, Powell notes both
that "[o]urs is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds
uniting the members of the nuclear family,"' 12 and that this tradition is in
"decline. ' 12 13 In effect, he acknowledges that past and future collide in this
case.
Powell does not leave it to local government, however, to determine the
path of future values. He does not appear in Moore as the defender of
208. For a radically different view of the importance of the issue in the case, see Justice Stewart's
dissent:
The interest that the appellant may have in permanently sharing a single kitchen and a suite
of contiguous rooms with some of her relatives simply does not rise to that level. To equate this
interest with the fundamental decisions to marry and to bear and raise children is to extend the
limited substantive contours of the Due Process Clause beyond recognition.
431 U.S. at 537.
209. Powell acknowledges the lesson of the Lochner era, citing the danger that judicial interven-
tion will be limited only by the "predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this
Court." Id. at 502. The history of the Lochner era, he writes, "counsels caution and restraint" but "it
does not counsel abandonment." Id. If the "lesson" of Lochner, however, is the danger of uncritical
acceptance of the status quo, see Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. - (1987) (forth-
coming), then Powell has learned little from that case.
210. Accordingly, in his opinion in Poe, Harlan consistently frames the issue as one involving a
right of "privacy." He quotes with approval Justice Brandeis' statement that the Framers "conferred,
as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men." 367 U.S. at 550 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Of course, setting the boundaries of the "private" is itself a
governmental function and this leads Harlan to discuss the relative strength of government claims to
regulate a variety of forms of sexual conduct. See 367 U.S. at 539-55. But c. Aleinikoff, supra note
13, at 998 n.308 (arguing that Harlan collapses the public/private distinction in Poe).
211. See Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARv. L. REv. 673, 742-43
(1963) (criticizing judicial balancing for readjusting on an ad hoc basis the constitutional balance
"between the individual and the community.").
212. Moore, 431 U.S. at 504.
213. Id. at 505.
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local authority. 14 Neither, however, does he appear as the defender of
individual liberty; that was the issue in Belle Terre.2 15 Rather, Powell
wants to have it both ways: He wants to defend Mrs. Moore without
having to defend the college students in Belle Terre.
The two positions are reconciled when we recognize that Powell is not
defending the individual's right to choose to live in an extended family.
Rather, he is defending the family itself. The balance that Powell seeks in
Moore is not between the individual and the state-the issue in Belle
Terre-but between the variety of manifestations of social authority in the
institutions of society. The family is one such institution. It is, for Powell,
an institution that competes with the local government as a source of
values.216
Powell defends the institution of the family by appealing to the same
values used to defend the political institutions of the local community
against the individual in Belle Terre. He views the family as the institu-
tion through which "we inculcate and pass down many of our most cher-
ished values, moral and cultural,' 17 a phrase that cannot help but recall
the praise of the local community as the domain of "family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion" in Belle Terre.'1 " For Powell,
both family and local community government are to be defended. The
judicial challenge is to accommodate the conflicting claims by giving voice
to each.
A series of cases focusing on First Amendment interests illustrates Pow-
ell's shift of the terms of the balance from the individual against the social
order to the constituent elements of the social order itself. This series be-
gins with Powell's dissent in Elrod v. Burns,""' in which the Court holds
that a patronage-related discharge of a nonpolicymaking county employee
is unconstitutional.
For Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality, the case requires "the res-
olution of conflicting interests under the First Amendment"-a conflict
214. An interesting comparison can be made with Justice Rehnquist's consistent defense of state
and local governments. See Powell, The CompleatJeffersonian:Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91
YALE L.J. 1317 (1982).
215. See Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The choice of household com-
panions-of whether a person's 'intellectual and emotional needs' are best met by living with family,
friends, professional associates, or others-involves deeply personal considerations as to the kind and
quality of intimate relationships within the home.").
216. The same move from the liberal model of individual versus state, of private versus public, to
the focus on family as an institution that competes with the state is found in Carey v. Population Serv.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), in which the Court strikes down a state law prohibiting distribution of
contraceptives to minors. Brennan's plurality opinion locates the constitutional defect of the statute in
its impact on the fundamental rights of a minor. Id. at 684-86. While Powell agrees with the out-
come, he finds the constitutional flaw in the statute's impact on the family: The statute contains no
exception for married minors or for parents who distribute contraceptives to their children. Id. at
707-08 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
217. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04 (footnote omitted).
218. 416 U.S. at 9.
219. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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between the interest in effective political campaigning and management,
furthered by a patronage system, and that in free individual belief, bur-
dened by that system. 220 Brennan argues that the individual's interest in
freedom of belief has to prevail over society's interest in efficient organiza-
tion: "The illuminating source to which we turn in performing the task
[of resolution of the conflict] is the system of government the First Amend-
ment was intended to protect, a democratic system whose proper function-
ing is indispensably dependent on the unfettered judgment of each citizen
on matters of political concern." '221 Powell disagrees, not just with the out-
come, but with the conceptual structure Brennan applies to the case. 2
While Brennan casts the case as a conflict between governmental au-
thority and individual liberty, Powell perceives the fundamental issue in
the case as the protection of the institution of the political party. The
conflict he sees is not between the individual and public authority, but
between the political parties and the institutions of government:
"[P]atronage hiring practices have contributed to American democracy by
stimulating political activity and by strengthening parties, thereby helping
to make government accountable.
'22 3
Of course, in defending patronage practices, Powell is also defending
the judgment of local government institutions that such practices are use-
ful. He may be too quick to identify this local judgment as one founded on
an interest in furthering "the democratic process in light of local condi-
tions, 22 when in fact it may be founded on an interest in party entrench-
ment. Nevertheless, the point remains-that Powell views the issue as fun-
damentally involving the viability of the political party system and only
secondarily involving the parochial self-interests of local government.
Most importantly, he does not perceive an individual liberty interest to be
protected against government.
Powell's position is further illuminated by comparing his opinion in
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti22 5 with that in Elrod. Writing
for the Court in Bellotti, Powell strikes down, on First Amendment
grounds, a state criminal statute that forbade expenditures by banks and
220. Id. at 371-72. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall and White. Justices Stewart
and Blackmun concurred in the judgment, but expressly distinguished the question of patronage fir-
ings from hirings. Id. at 374-75 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
221. Id. at 372.
222. Id. at 380-81 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell elaborates on this disagreement in Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 521 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting), in which the majority holds that the dismis-
sal of two assistant public defenders, solely because they are Republicans, violates the First Amend-
ment. In defending patronage appointments, Powell argues that they build stable political parties,
which in turn reduce the possibility of unrestrained factionalism and, by guaranteeing vigorous
campaigning, strengthen the democratic process. Id. at 528-29. Powell also extols "political club-
houses," which at the local level ensure that constituents obtain benefits from their elected officials. Id.
at 529 n.1 1.
223. 427 U.S. at 382 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
224. Id. at 386 n.9.
225. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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business corporations for the purpose of influencing votes on state
referenda. 2
One might think that there would be considerable difficulty in recon-
ciling Powell's positions in Elrod and Bellotti. Certainly a prohibition on
corporate expenditures raises the same kind of threat to political expres-
sion as that raised by conditioning public employment on party affilia-
tion.22 The distinction between requiring expression and prohibiting ex-
pression is surely not the determinative factor in Powell's mind.," The
difference in outcomes, however, reflects a deeper unity. In both, he is
protecting the institutional arrangement of authority within the existing
social order. In Elrod he defends the political party structure; in Bellotti,
he defends the property structure and, with it, corporate power within
American society.
Powell demonstrates his institutional perspective in his rejection of the
Bellotti dissent's focus on individual liberty. When the dissent describes
the statute as an attempt to protect the individual in the political process
by "preventing institutions which have been permitted to amass wealth
• . . for certain economic purposes from using that wealth to acquire an
unfair advantage in the political process," 2 ' Powell counters that "the
fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to sup-
press it."2 0 To speak of "persuasion" here is to accept a model of dis-
course that ignores the state's concern for the disproportionate access of
the modern corporation to the media of persuasion. 31 To accept this
226. The Massachusetts statute forbade any "corporation carrying on the business of a bank" to
"directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or contribute. . . any money or other valuable thing for the
purpose of. . . influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than
one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation." MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977), quoted in Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 768 n.2 (emphasis omitted). The
bank wanted to spend money to oppose a proposed state constitutional amendment authorizing a
graduated individual income tax. Id. at 769. The statute specifically provided that no question solely
concerning the taxation of individual income "shall be deemed materially to affect" the corporation.
Id. at 768 n.2.
227. Justice White's dissent in Bellotti frames the issue as follows:
The question posed by this case, as approached by the Court, is whether the State has struck
the best possible balance, i.e., the one which it would have chosen, between competing First
Amendment interests .. . . What is inexplicable, is for the Court to substitute its judgment as
to the proper balance for that of Massachusetts where the State has passed legislation reason-
ably designed to further First Amendment interests in the context of the political arena where
the expertise of legislators is at its peak and that of judges is at its very lowest.
435 U.S. at 804 (citation omitted). The problem of balancing competing First Amendment interests, of
acknowledging local government's political expertise, and of recognizing the Court's own lack of
knowledge all echo Powell's argument in Elrod.
228. Powell was perhaps the strongest defender on the Court of negative speech rights, even ex-
tending them to corporations. See Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903, 908-09
(1986) (Powell, J.); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 98-100 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
229. 435 U.S. at 809 (White, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 790.
231. Powell writes that "if there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information
and arguments advanced by appellants, it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First
Amendment." 435 U.S. at 792. The Framers, however, did not foresee the modern corporation, the
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model is implicitly to reject the attack on corporate power in defense of
individual liberty that lay behind the Massachusetts statute.
Powell's defense of the institutions of local government, then, is really
only part of a broader defense of that set of social institutions within the
society which together constitute the status quo. The unique aspect of
Powell's balance is this displacement of the individual as constituting one
side of the balance. This displacement is vividly demonstrated in his dis-
sent in Board of Education v. Pico,232 in which a majority of the Court
holds that the First Amendment limits the authority of a local school
board to remove books from a school library.233 Removal of books because
they offend community values would be, according to the Court, a form of
ideological censorship forbidden by the First Amendment.
The plurality does not hold against the Board in order to recognize a
competing institution within the social order; rather, it appeals to a vision
of individual liberty that opposes all authority. Powell rejects this vision.
For him, the case does not raise an issue of government censorship of the
individual, but rather an issue of preserving the community's values and
institutions. He writes with a certain fury that the Court's "decision sym-
bolizes a debilitating encroachment upon the institutions of a free
people.
' ' 34
A democratic social order, he suggests, does not rest upon individual
liberty, but upon a set of values that are given effect in the institutions of
that society. By focusing on the individual alone, Powell argues, the Court
will undermine the critical responsibility of the Board "to instill in its
students the ideas and values on which a democratic system depends. ' 235
Social structure, not individualism, is the foundation of democracy and,
correspondingly, of constitutional law.
236
In the same term as Pico, Powell joined the majority in holding that the
equal protection clause forbade Texas from excluding the children of ille-
gal aliens from its public schools.23 7 While Powell seems to defend the
individual child against the school board, this is not the way he perceives
modern media, or the modern public relations firm. See Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71
IOWA L. REv. 1405 (1986).
232. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
233. Arguably, only a plurality reaches the constitutional issue. Justice White concurs in the
judgment, stating that there is a material issue of fact to be resolved at trial and that there is no
"necessity" to reach the First Amendment issue "at this point." 457 U.S. at 883. However, unless
some constitutional limits apply to book removal, there would seem to be no point to resolving any
factual issues at trial.
234. Id. at 897.
235. Id. at 896.
236. See also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing the institutional role of the press from individual claims under the First Amendment);
Be VierJustice Powell and the First Amendment's "Societal Function": A Preliminary Analysis, 68
VA. L. RF~v. 177 (1982) (distinguishing process-protective, societal-function approach to First Amend-
ment from individual-rights approach).
237. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
19871
The Yale Law Journal
the issue. Rather, he sees in Plyler the same issue as in Pico: the transmis-
sion of social values embedded in an institutional structure.
Of Plyler, Powell writes: "By denying to illegal aliens the opportunity
'to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests' the law
under review placed a lifelong disability upon these illegal alien chil-
dren." '238 His concern, however, is not with the individual "disability" it-
self, but with its effect on the class structure of the community. The Texas
law, he writes, "threatens the creation of an underclass of future citizens
and residents." 2' 9 Moreover, "the creation within our borders of a sub-
class of illiterate persons many of whom will remain in the State [will
add] to the problems and costs of both State and National Governments
attendant upon unemployment, welfare, and crime.
'2 40
Thus, Powell views the issue not in terms of the right of a particular
child to an education, but in terms of the larger institutional consequences
that will follow if the Texas statute is allowed to stand. 4 The unedu-
cated child will become a member of a new and threatening institu-
tion-"the underclass." Such an underclass poses a threat to the status
quo-to the maintenance of those values that define the local, as well as
the national, community. Thus, for Powell, Plyer is analogous to Pico:
The task of constitutional law in both is to defend existing institutions
against the possibility of revolutionary disturbance that could emerge ei-
ther from an unrestrained individualism or from the development of a
new social class outside of the community.
2 42
The absence of an individualistic perspective leaves Powell free to ad-
just the balance to reflect the viewpoint of the speaker. The factional in-
terests speaking, and not the fact of speech alone, matter in Powell's bal-
ance. This is graphically illustrated in his concurrence in Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education.'4
238. Pico, 457 U.S. at 896 (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221).
239. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring).
240. Id. at 241.
241. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) ("[N]o charge
fairly could be made that the [Texas school] system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to
acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full partici-
pation in the political process.").
242. Powell's defense of the closure of the system in Pico and his insistence on openness in Plyler
are an interesting example of the patrician values described by Robert Burt in Two JEWISH Jus-
TWcFs (forthcoming). As a Richmond patrician, Powell understands that there is a status quo to de-
fend against outsiders, but he also understands that there are times when the only way to defend that
status quo is to invite in the outsiders who are threatening its very existence.
243. 431 U.S. 209, 244 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). See also Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 73 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551 (1972) (Powell, J.) (distinguishing right of Vietnam protestors to picket in private shopping plaza
from that of labor protestors recognized in Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968)). That the content-based distinctions of this approach are too much for a majority of
the Court is evident from the fact that just four years later, with Powell joining the majority, the
Court holds that Lloyd had, in fact, overruled Logan Valley. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976). In an ironic comment on his own methodology, Powell concedes in Hudgens that the prior
cases "cannot be harmonized in a principled way." 424 U.S. at 524 (Powell, J., concurring).
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In Abood, the Court upheld, over a First Amendment challenge, an
agency-shop agreement between a union and a public school board to the
extent that union service charges assessed against non-members were used
to finance employment-related activities by the union. Non-union teachers
could not be compelled to contribute to support the ideological and politi-
cal activities of the union, but neither could they receive a "free ride"
from the union's employment-related activities.
This holding is obviously in some tension with that of Elrod. There,
the Court held that political party membership could not generally be
made a condition of public employment; here, the Court holds that sup-
port of a union can be made such a condition.2" Powell, having dissented
in Elrod, should have little trouble with Abood. That is, having argued in
Elrod that the state can condition employment on participation in a politi-
cal party, he could be expected to argue that it can also condition employ-
ment on support of the union. The intrusion on an individual's free
speech interest seems the same in the two cases. Nevertheless, in Abood he
rejects the majority's support of the closed-shop agreement, arguing that
the public employee cannot be made to contribute support to the union at
all.2
45
In both Elrod and Abood, Powell uses the rhetoric of balancing. But in
Abood, he gives no weight at all to the governmental interest in avoiding
the "confusion" and "conflict" that would confront a public employer that
had to deal with rival unions: "I would have thought that 'conflict' in
ideas about the way in which government should operate was among the
most fundamental values protected by the First Amendment. ' ' 2", Surely,
the same could have been said in Elrod.2 " And, nowhere does he suggest
that the union, like the political party, might serve as a useful check on
the authority of local government.U
The relevant difference is not in the individual speech interest or in the
interest of local government per se, but in the need of the competing insti-
tutional interest to maintain its traditional position. In Elrod, Powell ar-
gues that historically the patronage system has been a critical element in
244. Justice Rehnquist, for example, writes: "Had I joined the plurality opinion in Elrod v.
Burns, I would find it virtually impossible to join the Court's opinion in this case." 431 U.S. at 242
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
245. Powell's position in Abood is a reverse image of that of the majority: Both are inconsistent
with positions taken in Elrod, but the inconsistency runs in the opposite direction. Powell's inconsis-
tency cannot be explained by assuming his acceptance of the majority position in Elrod as a matter of
stare decisis. In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 521 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting), Powell indicates
that he still adheres to his position in Elrod.
246. 431 U.S. at 261 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
247. Powell also writes that because the case is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, "the
record is barren of any demonstration by the State that excluding minority views from the processes
by which governmental policy is made is necessary to serve overriding governmental objectives." Id. at
262. But Elrod came before -he Court in exactly the same procedural posture. In that case, too, there
was no record on the strength of the local government interest in the patronage system.
248. Set supra text accompanying note 223.
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the maintenance of an active party system. But in Abood, he implies that
the union-shop agreement is not needed to protect the union. The union-
shop agreement, then, becomes an abuse of power by the union. It is not
the individual teacher, but the school board that is the true object of Pow-
ell's concern.
His defense of the First Amendment interests of the individual teacher
in Abood has much the same effect as his defense of the First Amendment
interest of the corporation in Bellotti. In each case, certain institutions of
authority are protected from a challenge by political opponents who con-
trol the local governmental power structure. Here, the school board is pro-
tected from the labor union; in Bellotti, the corporation is protected from
populist political forces.
In all of these cases, Powell's interests and efforts emerge as distinctly
representative. One traditional theory of the legislative function holds that
the representative assembly should be a microcosm of the larger commu-
nity, designed to produce a legislative product that reflects the relative
strength of various factional interests within the community.?4 Powell
aims for a similar result in -constitutional adjudication. 50 The Justice's
role is to conserve the community's values by conserving the existing dis-
tribution of authority within the social order.2 1
Powell rejects the view that constitutional law reveals a set of ideals
against which the social order is to be measured and toward which the
social order is to be directed. Neither, however, does he believe that consti-
tutional law is wholly set against change. Rather, change will be tolerated
at the margins, with a due awareness of its social cost and the substantial
community interest in stability.
252
249. Theories of proportional representation, for example, reflect this understanding. See, e.g., R.
DAH, A PREFA:E "ro DEMOcRATiC: THEORY 133-35 (1956); Note, Choosing Representatives by
Lottery Voting, 93 YAi.E L.J. 1283, 1293-300 (1984); H. PrriJN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTA-
TION 84 (1967) ("Representing may be seen as an accurate correspondence between legislature and
nation. . . to ensure that the legislature does what the people themselves would have done if they had
acted directly.").
250. Perhaps the most vivid example of this connection between Powell's model of constitutional
adjudication and a model of legislative structure is his opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797,
2831-32 (1986), in which he argues for a multi-factoral test of the constitutionality of political gerry-
manders. Powell's test would apply a substantially stronger constitutional constraint on apportionment
plans than that of the plurality, leading Justice White to accuse Justice Powell of supporting a consti-
tutional requirement of proportional representation: "Stripped of its 'factors' verbiage, Justice Pow-
ell's analysis turns on a determination that a lack of proportionate election results can support a
finding of an equal protection violation, at least in some circumstances." Id. at 2814.
251. The conservative cast Powell puts on representation locates him in the Whig tradition of
western political thought. See A. Btc:KEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT 3-30 (1975); Kronman,
Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1599-605 (1985). "The first respon-
sibility of the politician . . . is to promote consent by balancing or adjusting the different factions of
which his society is composed." Id. at 1604. While Bickel located the prudential values of the Whig
tradition in the Supreme Court's use of "passive virtues" to adjust principle to democratic majoritari-
anism, Powell locates the prudential virtues at the heart of the judicial opinion itself. See A. BicKEL,
THE LEArr DANGEROUS BRANCH 238-40 (1962). Whether this is a supportable model for judicial
review in a democratic order is considered below.
252. See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text (discussion of Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
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This is a position appropriately described as "balanced." The status
quo is a balance of competing institutions and interests. Powell draws
upon the balance that he perceives in the social order. Judging becomes a
matter of intuition, not argument, because the existing order has no prin-
cipled explanation. Rather, that order is historically contingent, a product
of a constant competition among competing interests that are changing in
both quality and quantity. The process of adjudication reflects that inex-
plicable contingency.
V. BALANCING AND THE ROLE OF THE COURT
In the jurisprudence of Justice Powell, three images of virtue coincide:
the good man, the good citizen, and the good judge.253 The President of
the American Bar Association is the President of the Richmond School
Board, and both are the Justice on the Supreme Court.'" This unity of
morality, politics and law is central to Justice Powell's concept of democ-
racy. Central to his concept of the judicial role is balancing. In this final
section, I examine the relationship between these two points: why balanc-
ing should be the role of the judge in a democratic society.
The first step in this inquiry is a brief examination of Powell's model
of democratic unity. The second is a consideration of the function of his
judicial balance in light of this model of democratic unity. The common
link between democracy as a form of government and balancing as a form
of judicial decisionmaking is their mutual reliance on community as a so-
cial structure that mediates between the individual and government. The
third step is a consideration of the strength of the judicial claim to re-
present the community in a democratic polity. This requires an examina-
tion of Justice Powell's surprisingly formalistic view of the limits on juris-
diction. Analysis of the disjunction between Powell's formal view of the
role of the Justice and what he actually does in judging will lead to the
(1982)).
253. Cf B. CARDOZO, THE NA'TURE OF THE JUDICIAL. PROMESS 133-34 (1921) (writing in chap-
ter on "the judge as a legislator," "that the judge is under a duty ... to maintain a relation between
law and morals, between the precepts of jurisprudence and those of reason and good conscience."); see
also E. Rosrow, THE SOVEREI;N PRE.RO(;ATIVE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUEST FOR
LAW 22-23 (1962) ("The lawyer, the legislator, the judge, and the law professor have different func-
tions, different degrees of discretion. . .But they confront the same standard of duty and responsibil-
ity. The modern lawyer can find no workable boundary between law and policy. ... ); cf. Fried,
supra note 56, at 761 ("authority cannot be conceded to persons because they are right-the authority
must preexist their right or wrong judgment and must survive it too-and judges decide cases by
virtue of their authority and not because they are more likely to be right than other people").
254. Before joining the Supreme Court, Powell served as President of the American Bar Associa-
tion, the American Bar Foundation, the American College of Trial Lawyers, and the Richmond Bar
Association, as a member of President Johnson's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Adminis-
tration of Justice, as President of the Virginia State Board of Education and Richmond School Board,
as Chairman of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, and as Trustee of Washington and Lee Uni-
versity. See 2 WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA 1986-1987 2248 (44th ed. 1986).
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conclusion that this model of balancing is an inappropriate basis for judi-
cial review.
A. Democracy and Community
For Justice Powell, the virtue of democratic government lies in a unity
between the government and the governed. The greater the division be-
tween government and citizen, the more authoritarian-and the less dem-
ocratic-is the political form. Political leadership is most democratic when
it functions as nothing more than a reflection of the community's own
values. This is the clear message of Powell's dissenting opinion in Board
of Education v. Pico." '
Powell writes that "School boards are uniquely local and democratic
institutions . . . . It is fair to say that no single agency of government at
any level is closer to the people whom it serves. . . .,,s The function of
this uniquely democratic institution is to "instill in its students the ideas
and values on which a democratic system depends,"' ' M and this means
distinguishing "our ideas or values" from those ideas that have a power
and political life "repugnant to a democratic society."
2"
Democratic government is that political arrangement in which there is
no distance between the community's values and the values defended and
promoted by the coercive authority of government. A "democratic society"
is both the condition and the product of such a government. In a democ-
racy the individual does not stand in opposition to his government, but
rather understands government as an expression and reflection of the com-
munity of which he is a part. This view explains Powell's vehement objec-
tion to the Pico plurality's framing of the issue as one in which govern-
ment stands opposed to individual-an opposition between authority and
freedom.
Community, for Powell, brings together government and individual.
Accordingly, he sees a coincidence of localism and democracy. As govern-
ment becomes more distant from the community, the gap between govern-
ment and individual is likely to grow. Powell extolls this model of democ-
racy in Garcia:
[M]embers of the immense federal bureaucracy are not elected, know
less about the services traditionally rendered by States and localities,
and are inevitably less responsive to recipients of such services, than
are state legislatures, city councils, boards of supervisors, and state
and local commissions, boards, and agencies. It is at these state and
255. 457 U.S. 853, 893 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 894.
257. Id. at 896.
258. Id. at 897; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (on role
of schools in inculcation of community's values).
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local levels-not in Washington as the Court so mistakenly
thinks-that "democratic self-government" is best exemplified.2 '
In Garcia, the interference with democracy came from Congress: It was
Congress that extended the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local
government. But the same problem of creating a polarity in place of a
union can arise from interference by the federal courts."' 0 Congress and
the Court stand equally distant from the community.
Thus, in Pico, the Court's interference with the decisions of the local
school board is described by Powell as "a debilitating encroachment upon
the institutions of a free people." '261 A free people is not measured by the
extent of its protection against the institutions of government; instead, it is
measured by the degree of its identification with the institutions of govern-
ment. A condition of such identification is government "responsiveness,"
precisely the virtue lost as government becomes more bureaucratic and
thus more distant.
Pico is quite revealing in this respect, because it concerns school board
censorship of books. Such censorship has been a vivid symbol of the dis-
tance between government and citizen: a symbol of governmental interfer-
ence with individual freedom of inquiry and belief, and a symbol of the
need for the individual to struggle against government in an effort freely
to define oneself." The case thus had enormous emotional and symbolic
value as an example of judicial protection of liberal values.2 63 Powell
clearly recognizes that "in different. times, the destruction of written
materials has been the symbol of despotism and intolerance."' " But this
was in societies in which government stood opposed to the populace,
where there was no community that linked the individual to the
government.2 5
259. 469 U.S. at 577 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 373-74 (1981)
(Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing "necessity of permitting experimentation with political structures
to meet the often novel problems confronting local communities" and condemning judicial interference
with "democratic process").
260. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 484-85 (1979) (Powell, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that "displacement of professional and local control that occurs when courts go into
the business of ... operating school systems" may have resulted in a breakdown of community sup-
port for public schools and a decision by many parents to turn from public to private schools).
261. Pico, 457 U.S. at 897.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 233-36 (comparing Brennan's framework of analysis).
263. Newspaper accounts of Pico, for example, focused on the book-banning aspects of the case.
See, e.g., High Court Limits Banning of Books, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1982, at Al, col. I; Court
Allows Trial in Book Banning, Wash. Post, June 26, 1982, at A8 (noting that case came during
"nationwide wave of book censorship"). Academic writers criticized the Court for not going far
enough-for conceding too much in recognizing a school board responsibility to inculcate civic values.
See, e.g., Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual
Rights in the Public School, 95 YAt.: L.J. 1647, 1653-54, 1680 (1986) ("[The school] is no longer
the institution pictured by Justice Powell .... The school is not the extension of the parent, but of
the government."); van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to
Inculcate Youth, 62 TF;x. L. REv. 197, 237, 292-93 (1983).
264. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 897 (Powell, J., dissenting).
265. One begins to see here some of the potential danger in the concept of community as a legal
19871
The Yale Law Journal
The absence of such a community is the very model of despotism. To
confuse a despotic with a democratic regime is to confuse censorship with
moral education. The Court's failure to understand the difference, Powell
suggests, itself raises the threat of despotism. The despotic threat to de-
mocracy can arise from both ends of the political spectrum, from both
factions of the Court.2 6* The middle ground is held by the community of
values, which Powell claims to represent.
Powell had addressed the same problem of democratic legitimacy in his
dissent in Furman v. Georgia,267 in which he opposed the Court's deci-
sion to strike down all existing death penalty statutes. There, too, he
feared that judicial interference would polarize government and citizenry.
"In a democracy," he argued, "the first indicator of the public's attitude
must always be found in the legislative judgments of the people's chosen
representatives."' 68 The danger he perceives in judicial interference is that
once disconnected from the community, judicial judgment is guided by
nothing but subjective preferences:
[W]here. . .the language of the applicable [constitutional] provision
provides great leeway and where the underlying social policies are
felt to be of vital importance, the temptation to read personal prefer-
ence into the Constitution is understandably great* It is too easy to
propound our subjective standards of wise policy under the rubric of
the more or less universally held standards of decency."'
Between the community and the Justice, then, there seems to be either no
space at all or a wholly unbridgeable space.
For Powell, the problem of judicial legitimacy, therefore, is the problem
of locating judicial review in a community of values that bridges the po-
ideal. The "community" can too easily subsume the minority; it can fail to recognize a place for
diversity. Thus, book burning may be not only an act of a government disconnected from a popular
base, but an act of majority tyranny directed at a minority.
266. In Pico, Powell perceives the threat to community from the liberal bloc on the Court. But the
nature of Rehnquist's dissent suggests that a parallel threat may arise from the government. Unlike
Powell, who insists that the board of education will represent the community's values, Rehnquist
writes that it is a matter of constitutional indifference whether that board-i.e., government-acts on
the community's values or on values personal to board members. 457 U.S. at 909 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
267. 408 U.S. 238, 414 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 436-37. Interestingly, Powell turns to both referenda and jury verdicts as evidence of
community values to support his claim that there is a link between those values and the death penalty
statutes. Id. at 438-43. He concludes that "the weight of the evidence indicates that the public gener-
ally has not accepted either the morality or the social merit of the views so passionately advocated by
the articulate spokesmen for abolition." Id. at 443.
269. Id. at 431. See also id. at 458 ("This Court is not empowered to sit as a court of sentencing
review, implementing the personal views of its members on the proper role of penology. To do so is to
usurp a function committed to the Legislative Branch and beyond the power and competency of this
Court."). Judicial interference with legislative judgment in the face of this evidence of legislative
responsiveness to community values represents, for Powell, a "basic lack of faith and confidence in the




tential tension between individual and government. He must make plausi-
ble the claim that the Court defends the community against governmental
decisions when those decisions do not reflect the community's values. 70
Balancing presents a model of the judicial role that is designed to address
this problem.
B. Judicial Balancing and Community
In broad terms, one can speak of two competing models of the nature
and function of the political order: an economic and a public interest
model.271 In the former, all ends are regarded as subjective, meaning that
they are of no value in themselves, but valuable only because they are the
choice of some individual or group of individuals. Government, in this
view, is one institutional form-the market is another-through which a
society of private individuals with conflicting interests makes public
choices among these multiple desires. The process of governing is under-
stood as a particular form of the general process of bargaining; its value is
only as an instrument for achieving private ends.
In the public interest model, on the other hand, values are understood
as objective. That an individual or a group has an end is not yet a reason
for political action to effectuate that end. The end must still be measured
against some standard of the public interest. The process of governing is
no longer that of bargaining, but now that of deliberating about the con-
tent of public values. The model for. government is the debate, not the
negotiation. The political decisionmaker is the trustee, not the agent, of
his constituency.'
72
The role of the judge differs considerably in the two models. In the
public interest model, a judge may have some claim to special expertise.
Deliberation about public values and principles may be a role for which
he is particularly suited. Even if he is not more acute in his philosophical
insight, the very appearance of a court engaged in deliberation about the
public interest may serve the function of announcing to the community
and particularly to the other governmental decisionmakers that they must
act on a basis other than private interest.27
270. Traditionally, not the judge, but the jury, or at least the jury venire, has been understood to
represent a fair cross-section of the community and thus to protect the community's values against
potentially deviant governmental decisions. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1717 & n.8 (1986);
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1975); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
271. For an insightful discussion of the two models and their appearance in the law of local
government, see Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judi-
cial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977-78).
272. The new republicanism emerging in contemporary legal scholarship embraces this model of
the political order. See, e.g., Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984);
Michelman, supra note 88; Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29
(1985). For a critique of this movement's effort to link the public interest model with a theory of
participatory democracy, see Kronman, Cooley Lectures (1987) (unpublished) (on file with author).
273. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L.
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In the economic model, a judge cannot claim any special expertise in
the ends of government. If public choices are nothing more than the prod-
ucts of bargaining over private interests, then the judge has little to say
with respect to the value or appropriateness of the choices made. He
would be doing nothing beyond expressing his own private interests, be-
cause by definition there is no objective measure. In this model, the role of
the judge, to the degree that it is involved with governmental ends at all, is
primarily that of correcting for market failure in the process of govern-
mental bargaining.7'
Powell's balancing combines these two models. On the one hand, he
believes in the economic model of ends: Ends have value only as they
express the interests of particular individuals and groups. There are no
absolute values, no objective goods, apart from a particular group's adop-
tion of those values. On the other hand, he believes that there is a public
interest apart from particular factional interests. The public interest is
simply that all such private interests be accorded respect by the commu-
nity. The first principle of the community must be openness to all compet-
ing interests. Thus, the public interest is empty of all substantive mean-
ing, beyond the principle of accommodation or openness-a value that
must itself be given form and effect in the competition of private
interests.2 75
The metaphor of balancing captures this combination of the two models
of government in its essential ambiguity between process and outcome.
The balancing process suggests a free competition between competing in-
terests; the balanced outcome suggests an ideal of mutual respect for op-
posing interests. Thus, Powell does not defend any right or principle as
absolute: that would suggest an objective value protected from the compet-
itive market of community interests. Yet he measures the public choice
that is the outcome of the political process against his own vision of a
balanced accommodation of interests. The zero-sum balance captures the
first part of this vision; the representative balance captures the second
part.
The judicial role may be corrective of the political process, operating
RF:v. 1, 14 (1979) ("The task of a judge. . . should be seen as giving meaning to our public values
and adjudication as the process through which that meaning is revealed or elaborated."); Michelman,
supra note 88, at 74 ("[Tlhe courts, and especially the Supreme Court, seem to take on as one of their
ascribed functions the modeling of active self-government that citizens find practically beyond
reach.").
274. For a corrective, process-based theory of constitutional law, see J. Es.y, DEMOCRACY AND
DtsTiusr (1980).
275. Accommodation is a public interest value that distinguishes this approach from traditional
utilitarianism. Utilitarianism depends on a means of intersubjective comparison of utility. As with any
market model, some interests may lose to more powerful, competitive claims. Accommodation, on the
other hand, does not rely on such a claim of objective comparison. It aims at an openness that may not
maximize utility. For this reason, Powell's attempts to embrace cost/benefit analysis are not, and
cannot be, successful. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (discussing failure of cost/
benefit analysis in Mathews).
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when the balance within the community is disturbed by the seizure of the
institutions of coercive power by a faction, or when the community closes
itself off to a factional interest.27 6 But there is nothing about this model of
the judicial function that limits it to a narrow remedial role. Representa-
tive balancing is not a doctrine of judicial restraint. There may not be
substantive public values apart from competing private interests, but there
is still an accommodation to be reached within that competition. Repre-
sentative balancing claims for the Justice a responsibility for designing the
rule of accommodation among the competing interests.
77
The Court appears as an alternative forum for establishing the balance
among competing interest groups and institutions. 78 In a case like Bakke,
Powell's role is surely not best understood as corrective; rather, he views
the Court as the forum in which the different interests will be given a
voice. The lawsuit becomes the occasion for action but not the justification
for that action. The Justice is within, not without, the community. He is
not measuring the public choice by a standard external to the community,
but rather expressing the values of the community itself. Yet, this view is
not reflected-in fact, it seems to be rejected-in justice Powell's formal
theory of federal court jurisdiction.
C. Jurisdictional Limits: Injury and Voice
Justice Powell led the way in the development of strict standing rules
by the contemporary Court. Powell is the author of the Court's opinion in
Warth v. Seldin,'7 in which the Court substantially tightens the injury
requirement as a test of standing.280 At issue in Warth is a challenge to
the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance of the town of Penfield, which
plaintiffs allege excludes low- and moderate-income residents. Essentially,
276. The state may not, for example, act upon simple prejudice and refuse to recognize the inter-
ests of a particular faction, because that would deny the premise of a pluralist community. See, e.g.,
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 292-93 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (equal
protection clause reaches prejudice against any racial group); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977) (state must recognize interests of illegitimate children in inheriting from intestate fathers);
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187 (1972) (state university may not refuse to recognize a chapter of
Students for a Democratic Society based on "mere disagreement . . . with the group's philosophy").
Neither may a faction express an interest that is inconsistent with this image of community. In both
Healy and Bakke, for example, Powell rejects factional claims to exclusive rights or manifestations of
factional interests that are not open to competing claims. The same is true in First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
277. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("But
how are competing interests to be assessed? Since they are not subject to quantitative ascertainment,
the issue necessarily resolves itself into asking, who is to make the adjustment?-who is to balance the
relevant factors. . . .Full responsibility. . . cannot be given to the courts. Courts are not represen-
tative bodies."). Powell, at times, invokes similar language of restraint. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 464 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). Such restraint, however, is hardly typical of his
judicial activity.
278. See Fiss, supra note 273, at 41 ("I place adjudication on a moral plane with legislative and
executive action. I . . .treat courts as a coordinate source of government power .... .
279. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
280. Worth invoked both Article III and the Court's prudential standing rules. Id. at 498-502.
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their claim is that the interests of those groups were not given voice in the
political process or in the product of that process. Neither, however, are
they given voice before the Court. According to Powell, none of the diverse
parties has standing.
Private parties who allege that they are unable to afford property
within the town are rejected because the purchase of a residence depends
upon "the efforts and willingness of third parties to build low- and mod-
erate-cost housing."281 Parties who live in a neighboring city and claim
that the Penfield ordinance results in an increase in their taxes, because of
the additional burden of housing the poor kept out of Penfield, are re-
jected because the asserted injury is nothing more than an "ingenious aca-
demic exercise in the conceivable."2 ' An organization that includes resi-
dents of Penfield is rejected because the interest of those residents is
indirect, relying on injury to those directly excluded by the ordinance. Fi-
nally, organizations of building concerns are rejected because their mem-
bers are not currently pursuing projects in Penfield, despite the fact that
the existing ordinance makes such projects futile.
In Simon v. Eastern Kenticky Welfare Rights Organization,83 Powell
goes even further, holding this narrow reading of injury to be an Article
III requirement and thus beyond the control of Congress. In Simon, low-
income individuals and representative organizations challenge an IRS rul-
ing as violative of the Internal Revenue Code and the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. They allege that the controverted ruling encourages hospitals
to deny services to the indigent-services upon which plaintiffs depend.
Although Powell acknowledges that the plaintiffs alleged an injury-in-fact
and that Congress provided a cause of action to challenge the agency regu-
lation, he nevertheless holds that the allegations fail to demonstrate the
requisite Article III injury because "[it is purely speculative whether the
denials of service specified in the complaint fairly can be traced to peti-
tioners' 'encouragement' or instead result from decisions made by the hos-
pitals without regard to the tax implications."' "
Injury is a test of uncertain scope and, accordingly, one that is subject
to substantial manipulation-or at least the charge of manipulation-in
order to control the Court's docket. Powell is, indeed, open to the charge
281. Id. at 505.
282. Id. at 509 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)).
283. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
284. Id. at 42-43. The degree of "speculation" would seem to go to the likelihood of success on
the merits, not standing. Powell relies on Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), which held
that the mother of an illegitimate child did not have standing to challenge a state practice of prosecut-
ing only fathers of legitimate children under a child support statute. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 44. But as
Justice Brennan points out, the requirement of a direct nexus in Linda R.S. was probably understood
as a prudential, not a constitutional, aspect of the law of standing, applopriate in the particular
context of a criminal prosecution in which the legislature has not created a cause of action. Id. at
58-59 & n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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of just such manipulation.285 The interesting point here, however, is the
jurisdictional theory itself and not its application.
Powell clearly states his reasons for strict standing requirements: "Re-
laxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion of
judicial power [resulting in] a shift away from a democratic form of gov-
ernment."12" As Powell explains in Warth, establishing strict limits on the
kind, quality, and directness of justiciable injury is intended to "limit the
role of the courts in resolving public disputes.""
Without such limitations .. .the courts would be called upon to
decide abstract questions.of wide public significance even though
other governmental institutions may be more competent to address
the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unneces-
sary to protect individual rights.
2"
The strictness of the injury requirement defended in Warth and Simon,
however, is not likely to contribute to the protection of individual rights.
Neither the allegedly discriminatory zoning nor prejudicial IRS regulation
were likely to be remedied by political institutions that were themselves
the alleged wrongdoers. More important, the function of judging which
most characterizes Justice Powell's work is precisely that of deciding "ab-
stract questions of wide public significance." There is, in short, a sizable
gap between his actual jurisprudence and the jurisdictional theory offered
to support that jurisprudence. 8 9
This narrow focus on injury has little to do with the role Justice Powell
actually plays in balancing.290 That balancing enterprise requires that the
Court allow in the broadest range of interests. The Court must give each
285. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280-81 n.14 (opinion of Powell, J.)
(student has standing to challenge medical school's admissions criteria, although student has not al-
leged that he would have been admitted in the absence of those criteria); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72-74 (1978) (Powell joins majority holding that appellees have
standing to challenge constitutionality of Price-Anderson Act limiting liability of nuclear power plants
for nuclear accidents despite speculativeness of such accident); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260 & n.7 (1977) (Powell writes for Court that respondent
has standing to challenge zoning practices under equal protection clause despite suspension of federal
housing assistance program upon which respondent intended to rely).
286. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). Judicial
balancing seems always to raise this worry among its proponents. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 650 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that judicial review may
be an "undemocratic aspect of our scheme of government" and "serves to prevent the full play of the
democratic process").
287. 422 U.S. at 500.
288. Id. (citation omitted).
289. There might be a tendency to view Powell's theory of injury as serving the same role as
Bickel's theory of the prudential virtues of the Supreme Court. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGER-
ous BRANCH, supra note 251, at 111-98. But the prudential virtues for Bickel were virtues only
insofar as they affected the substantive norms of constitutional adjudication: They were means to that
end. Id. at 69-71. The same cannot be said of Powell's theory of injury, which is simply unrelated to
the judicial task of balancing.
290. See Chayes, supra note 16, at 1305 (on tension between standing doctrine of Warth and
public law litigation role of federal district courts).
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competing interest a voice; it must consider all costs and benefits; and it
must have unhindered access to the values attached to competing interests
by the community. Representative balancing should be marked by an
openness to the widest possible array of parties and conflicting interests.
Furthermore, representative balancing requires this openness not just in




Without such openness, the claim of Justice Powell to stand in, and not
apart from, the community is impossible to justify. The legitimacy of his
balancing, in short, depends not on injury but on voice. Injury, in this
view, appears to be an arbitrary trigger for judicial intervention.2 9
As a representative institution within the domain of politics, the Court
cannot explain itself. At least, Justice Powell cannot offer a positive ex-
planation of this role-one that justifies judicial action as an element of a
system of representative democracy. Instead, he offers a remedial model of
judicial legitimacy within a democratic polity. In the final Section, I ex-
plain why this tension between the substance of the judicial role and the
justification of that role emerges.
D. Democracy and Judicial Balancing
There is in the balancing jurisprudence of Justice Powell an unresolv-
able tension, reflecting the uncertain role of constitutional adjudication in
a democratic community. Objectivity is to be found in the community, but
the Justice has no easy way to get out of the Court and into the commu-
nity. Judicial intervention always threatens to appear as interference with
the "institutions of a free people. ' 29 Powell's use of the variety of forms
of balancing constitutes a response to the charge of judicial subjectivity
and hence political illegitimacy. The instability of each form of balancing
indicates that there is no peace to be found in any of them.
The attempt to accommodate each interest gives the representative bal-
ance an inescapably political appearance, which, at its best, is a kind of
statesmanship. ' " But the more statesmanlike the Justice appears, the
more insecure his position is likely to become. When the Justice addresses
"abstract questions of . . . wide public significance," there always ap-
pears to be a "shift away from a democratic form of government." M  To
291. See supra notes 176-96 and accompanying text.
292. Cf. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 183-85 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (criti-
cizing Court's test for taxpayer standing as unrelated to any meaningful criterion).
293. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 897 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
294. See Kronman, supra note 272, on the role of statesmanship in the legal profession.
295. This appearance is well illustrated by Powell's opinion in Bakke, but it is also found in
another classic example of the representative balance which Powell did not write, although he did
join: Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Blackmun follows exactly the methodology of representative balancing. He starts with a survey of
the variety of competing interests-the privacy interest of the mother, and the interest of the state in
health and in potential life. He then designs a rule that recognizes each of these competing interests.
Each interest is given a voice, is recognized as legitimate and given a place in the final rule. Blackmun
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hold onto the goal of recognition and accommodation, Powell turns to the
administrative balance and its promise of objectivity through cost/benefit
analysis." 6 But if Justices are in a poor position to claim the virtues of
the statesman, they are in an even poorer position to claim those of the
bureaucrat. To the extent that the task of judging can be made to approx-
imate that of the bureaucrat, it is no longer one for the Justice. At that
point, either analysis gives way to deference to the bureaucrats themselves,
or cost/benefit analysis becomes merely a form of rhetoric that obfuscates
the "soft," nonquantifiable values that are at the heart of the judicial en-
terprise.? 7 In either case, the Court loses the claim to objectivity in
balancing.
2 8
Finally, the Justice looks for a legitimate role in a vision of irreducible
conflict: the conflict to which the zero-sum balance responds. This model
of conflict resolution, however, is fundamentally inconsistent with the
model of community to which the balancing enterprise was intended to
respond. For Powell, the community is irreducibly pluralistic, not exclu-
sionary. Zero-sum balancing, therefore, merges into representative balanc-
ing: exclusion gives way to inclusion."'
Representative balancing locates the Court alongside the political insti-
tutions of society, within the domain of competing factional interests. It
suggests that values are unidimensional and that a court need not reflect
on the differences among moral, social, political, and legal values. Thus,
over and over again, one finds at the critical section of a Powell opinion,
at the point at which the balance is -struck, a complete lack of reliance
upon traditional, or even non-traditional, legal materials-text, precedent,
constitutional history, constitutional structure, or moral and political the-
ory. Specifically legal sources cannot be determinative because that would
attempts to support the weighting of these competing interests in the community's own valuation
through a long discourse on historical standards and community values. But that statesmanlike at-
tempt at a grand accommodation has become the symbol of an unrestrained judicial activism which is
based on nothing more than judicial subjectivity. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 456-58, 460-61 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Ely, supra note 47, at 924-25;
Rhoden, supra note 47, at 644-47, 656-58; Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Forword:
Toward A Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. Rirv. 1, 4-5, 10 (1973).
296. Ducat notes that the "criterion for choice among competing interests can be qualitative or
quantitative." C. Ducxr, supra note 15, at 176. He fails, however, to see the dialectical relationship
between the two forms of balancing.
297. In theory, the Court could play a useful checking function on bureaucratic cost/benefit anal-
ysis. The majority's sound rejection of Powell's position in Kassel v. Consolidated Frieghtways Corp.,
450 U.S. 662 (1981) is, however, an explicit, practical rejection of this theoretical possibility.
298. With what must be deliberate understatement, Ducat writes: "[I]n fact the criteria for choos-
ing among competing interests have never been stated with precision, or even reasonable clarity, for
that matter." C. Ducwr, supra note 15, at 124. Indeed, they cannot be stated at all. See also Greena-
walt, supra note 83, at 997 ("There is, regrettably, no exact scale for weighing competing considera-
tions as one weighs oranges."). Greenawalt suggests that "[an explicit weighing process may itself be
something of a corrective to the bias reflected in an intuitive decision . . . ." Id. At least for Justice
Powell, balancing is an exercise in intuition, not a device to mitigate the effects of intuition.
299. This is precisely the move that one finds in Roe: having set the problem up as one of mutu-
ally exclusive alternatives-whether the mother's right to privacy should yield to the state's interests
or vice versa-the Court ends with a rule that gives voice to all interests.
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suggest that law provides values against which social interests can be eval-
uated, that legal values stand apart from other social interests.
300
Representative balancing sets the wrong task before the Court. Instead
of calling on legal argument and the unique virtues of the Justice, it calls
upon the virtues of statesmanship. But a Justice is not likely, at least in
our political order, to be able to compete successfully with other political
decisionmakers in the domain of statesmanship.30 1 The best evidence of
this is Justice Powell's own attack, in his standing jurisprudence, on the
undemocratic character of that judicial process which is most characteristic
of his own approach. 0 If Powell cannot claim for himself the virtues of
statesmanship as the ground of judicial legitimacy, then surely the politi-
cal order will not recognize that ground.
A court engaged in representative balancing will always appear illegiti-
mate because it offers nothing new to the political debate. Discussion is
not terminated, but the kind of discussion the judicial opinion invites is
simple disagreement, rather than explanation and justification. This kind
of Court or Justice is always open to consideration of a new set of circum-
stances or a slightly different set of interests, Justice Powell can distin-
guish, but he cannot justify. In justification, and not in distinction, how-
ever, lies the only possible ground of legitimacy for judicial review.
The role of the Court must be to speak, not to intuit. The purpose of
the judicial opinion is not to enter the political debate but rather to change
the terms of that debate, to speak to that debate from a different perspec-
tive.3 03 While there is always going to be disagreement about the "right"
judicial perspective, the Justice must make an effort to justify the perspec-
300. Powell's use of stare decisis as a principle of decision seems entirely arbitrary. He has writ-
ten several opinions that imply that he is a strong advocate of stare decisis. See, e.g., Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557-58, (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting); Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 & n.1 (1983); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S.
783, 798 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (expressing disagreement with principles of "mathematical
exactitude" in legislative apportionment announced before he joined the Court, but agreeing that in-
stant cases were indistinguishable from earlier cases and thus concurring). By contrast, in Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), where Powell's opinion for the Court holds that a life sentence without
possibility of parole for a recidivist passing false checks violates the Eighth Amendment, the dissenters
accuse him of "blithely discard[ing] any concept of stare decisis ..... Id. at 304 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), Justice Brennan accuses the Court of overruling
at least eleven cases sub silentio. Id. at 518-19 & n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting). And in Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), Justice Stevens accuses Powell, writing for
the Court, of repudiating "at least 28 cases, spanning well over a century. . . ." Id. at 127 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
301. See R. BFtIGt:R, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 337-46 (1969); Brest, Who Decides?,
58 S. CAL. L. REv. 661, 667-70 (1985); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLrr-
ICAL PROt'xss 27-28 (1980); H. COMMAGER, MAJORITy RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS (1943);
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtus"--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in
Judicial Review, 64 COI.UM. L. REv. 1, 24-25 (1964); L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 39-40
(1958); Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARv. L. REv. 84, 98-99 (1959); Wechsler, supra note 30, at 15-17.
302. See supra notes 279-92 and accompanying text.
303. See Ackerman, supra note 87 (contrasting constitutional politics, which informs the language
of the Court, with ordinary politics).
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tive offered. And, to succeed, that justification must speak a language dif-
ferent from that of ordinary politics.
The Court in our democratic system is inevitably outside of, not within,
the community. The Justice is not the jury.30 He represents the law to
the community, not the community to the law. The Court alone of all the
institutions of government is qualified through its construction and loca-
tion to articulate principle as a limit on power."0 5 If it fails to do this, it
has neither the qualifications nor the structure to wield power. If it no
longer believes in principle, then it will be the poor stepchild to other
institutions that can make a stronger claim to power.
The uncertain status of the balancing court is marked again and again
in the silence at the heart of a Justice Powell opinion. One cannot engage
a Powell opinion; one can only point to the mysterious gap between its
beginning and its end. Powell is partaking of power itself, for there is no
speech. That power may be wielded for benevolent ends, to be sure, but it
is still mere power.
The benevolent use of power, of course, can be attractive; it may pro-
duce agreeable results.3° Articulate argument is not a complete answer in
itself, for there may be poor arguments and wrong principles, just as
surely as there may be good arguments and right principles.- But ulti-
mately, a Court dedicated to constitutional adjudication cannot exercise
power unjustified by principle.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court must stand apart from the community, not within the com-
munity, if it is to judge the products of power. A balancing court will
always appear as an uncertain usurper of the reins of power. And this
uncertainty will inevitably infect the Court's own vision of and confidence
in itself. This uncertainty produces the dissonance found in Justice
Powell's theory of standing. Judicial power without articulate principle
will appear illegitimate even to those who wield that power.
A Court with little to say will become a Court with little to do. A
Court that cannot defend judicial activism by appeal to articulate princi-
ple will become a passive Court. In a democratic political order, a consti-
304. There is no function of the judge or Justice analogous to jury nullification. See Chayes,
supra note 16, at 1287 (discussing distinction between roles of judge and jury with respect to law and
"changing community mores" in traditional litigation). See also H. KAI.VEN & H. ZFISEL, THE
AMERIGAN JURY 8-9 (1966).
305. See A. B:KKL., THE LvA r DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 251, at 23-28 (1963) (on
virtues of judges compared to legislatures and executives).
306. The strong negative response to Justice Powell's retirement was based almost exclusively on
consideration of the results, and not the process, of his decisionmaking. For many, Powell's balancing
approach within a severely divided Court is preferable to resolution of the ideological split in a way
with which they disagree. I have not tried to address arguments concerning the merits of the results of
particular cases.
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tutional court will act only to the limits of those principles that it can
articulate, principles which justify intervention against the products of
majoritarian politics. As those principles diminish, so does the role of the
Court.
Justice Powell has not left the Court with adequate grounds to justify
judicial readjustment of the political balance to achieve a more just and
humane outcome. Representation of the community, therefore, is likely to
be left by the future Court to the representative branches.
If the Court is to limit government, it cannot do so in the name of the
community. In the competition to represent the community, the Court will
always lose. A Justice who cannot distinguish individual rights against the
community from interests of the community cannot speak of constitutional
truth, and without this, he has little to say to us.
